People v. Knight
168 N.E.3d 974
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Dec. 2, 1995: Ervin Shorter was carjacked and later found shot to death; Tywon Knight and codefendant Richard Morris were tried and convicted of murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated vehicular hijacking.
- Knight was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 145 years; Morris originally received death (commuted), was retried, and on resentencing received consecutive terms totaling 105 years.
- Knight filed a pro se postconviction petition claiming his 145-year sentence was unconstitutionally disparate because Morris was the actual shooter; petition advanced to second stage and counsel was appointed.
- This court previously found postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by supplying inaccurate sentencing information and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, directing the circuit court to consider Morris’s retrial and resentencing records.
- On remand the same postconviction counsel was reappointed, again misstated that Knight’s sentences were concurrent (and therefore shorter than Morris’s), failed to present the trial-court findings from Morris’s resentencing (that Morris was the shooter and moving force), and the trial court denied relief after argument only.
- This appeal holds the trial court erred in reappointing the same counsel and that a new third-stage evidentiary hearing with different counsel is required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court may reappoint the same postconviction counsel previously found to have provided unreasonable assistance | Reappointment was permissible; counsel complied with Rule 651(c) | Reappointment was error because counsel had been found to render unreasonable assistance on the same matter | Court held reappointment was error; new counsel must be appointed on remand |
| Whether counsel again provided unreasonable assistance on remand by misstating sentencing facts | The State relied on counsel’s representations and argued no disparity | Knight argued counsel again provided inaccurate sentencing info and failed to present Morris’s resentencing findings that he was the shooter | Court held counsel again provided unreasonable assistance (misstatement not a strategy) and remand is necessary |
| Whether Knight’s 145-year sentence is unconstitutionally disparate from Morris’s 105-year sentence | The State argued no unconstitutional disparity (misstated Knight’s sentences as concurrent and shorter) | Knight argued disparity because Morris was found to be the actual shooter and moving force | Court did not decide the disparity merits on the record; ordered a new evidentiary hearing so the claim can be fully considered with correct records and counsel |
| Standard for evaluating postconviction counsel at third stage and applicability of Rule 651(c) | State argued Rule 651(c) governs counsel’s duties | Knight argued general reasonableness standard applies at third stage and appellate mandate required compliance | Court explained Rule 651(c) governs second-stage duties only; third-stage standard is general reasonableness and remand required to enforce appellate mandate |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (principles regarding facts increasing sentence beyond prescribed statutory maximum)
- United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (sentencing court may consider conduct underlying acquitted charge by preponderance standard)
- People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004) (reversal based on ineffective assistance at trial; background for Morris’s retrial and resentencing)
- People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006 (2016) (Rule 651(c) is a vehicle for ensuring reasonable assistance but not the only measure)
- People v. Brown, 229 Ill. 2d 374 (2008) (discussing standard of proof at sentencing)
- People v. Gonzalez, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1026 (2011) (remanding court’s opinion/mandate must be followed and enforced)