People v. Kines
37 N.E.3d 428
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- In 1988 John E. Kines was convicted (bench trial) of first‑degree murder (accountability), concealment of a homicidal death, and intimidation for the killing of 11‑year‑old Taneka Jones; sentence: 50 years.
- The State’s case relied primarily on 11‑year‑old eyewitness Cornell Finley, who gave inconsistent statements; physical evidence (victim’s clothing, a ligature sleeve, and three semen‑stained tissues) was admitted at trial. Serology linked the semen to co‑defendant Jordan; Kines’ hair was not found on the body or clothing.
- Kines filed a pro se section 116‑3 (postconviction DNA testing) petition in 2002; the trial court denied it because the requested testing technology existed at trial, and this court affirmed (Kines I).
- In 2013 Kines (with counsel) filed a new section 116‑3 petition seeking PCR‑STR testing of the ligature, clothing, and tissues and CODIS upload if 13+ loci obtained; he also argued the 2007 statutory amendment changed the controlling legal standard.
- The trial court denied the 2013 petition on res judicata grounds and on the merits (finding no reasonable likelihood of more probative results). On reconsideration the State conceded the evidence had not been previously DNA tested; the court again denied relief. Kines appealed.
- The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding res judicata did not bar the 2013 petition given the 2007 amendment and that Kines satisfied section 116‑3’s requirements for testing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Kines) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 2013 section 116‑3 petition is barred by res judicata because of Kines I (2003) | Kines I finally adjudicated his DNA‑testing claim; thus res judicata bars relitigation | Kines I was decided under the pre‑2007 statute requiring proof that testing tech was unavailable at trial; the 2007 amendment changed the law so res judicata should not apply | Not barred; res judicata relaxed because earlier judgment conflicts with equitable implementation of amended statute |
| Proper interpretation of section 116‑3 as amended in 2007 (untested vs previously tested evidence) | (Implicit) Prior decision controls; earlier analysis remains relevant | 2007 amendment added (a)(1) permitting testing of evidence never previously subjected to requested testing without proving unavailability at trial | Court: 2007 amendment permits testing where evidence was not previously tested—satisfied here |
| Whether Kines met section 116‑3(b) prima facie requirements (identity issue and chain of custody) | Argued previously, and court questioned chain issues | Identity was contested at trial; chain of custody for evidence admitted at trial is presumed (Johnson) | Prima facie satisfied: identity was disputed; chain of custody presumed for admitted evidence |
| Whether requested testing meets section 116‑3(c) (scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative, materially relevant evidence) | Argued testing unlikely to change result given trial evidence and accountability theory | PCR‑STR testing could produce new, noncumulative DNA identifying others or excluding Kines; even partial favorable results can be materially relevant | Court: Testing has scientific potential to produce materially relevant evidence and is generally accepted; testing should be allowed |
Key Cases Cited
- Lutkauskas v. Ricker, 2015 IL 117090 (res judicata framework and de novo review)
- Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462 (res judicata bars what was decided and what could have been decided)
- Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325 (equitable exception to res judicata where prior judgment conflicts with statutory scheme)
- People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756 (2013/2014 discussion of the 2007 amendment imposing stricter standards for retesting previously tested evidence)
- People v. Johnson, 205 Ill. 2d 381 (chain‑of‑custody requirement excused for evidence admitted at trial)
- People v. Shum, 207 Ill. 2d 47 (identity as central issue for postconviction testing when defendant consistently denies involvement)
- People v. Rodriguez, 229 Ill. 2d 285 (accountability: acts of one defendant attributed to all)
- People v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203 (material relevance standard: testing need not completely exonerate to be materially relevant)
- People v. Rozo, 2012 IL App (2d) 100308 (permitting DNA testing of co‑defendants’ evidence; testing encouraged when it may yield relevant information)