2018 IL App (3d) 150803
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Brandon Kindelspire, a registered sex offender, was indicted on two counts for violating the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/6): failing to notify Morris police within three days after leaving his Morris residence (Count I) and failing to notify Mazon police within three days after establishing residence in Mazon (Count II).
- Stipulated evidence: Kindelspire registered in Morris on January 1, 2014, and in Mazon on March 17, 2014; prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse admitted.
- State presented evidence (lease in February, municipal water/sewer account in January, sightings, truck at Mazon) asserting Kindelspire had moved to Mazon and failed to timely register there.
- Defense evidence and testimony (fiancée, family, Kindelspire) disputed that he established Mazon as a residence before mid-March; he worked long hours, often slept in his truck or grandmother’s home, and claimed he did not reside overnight at Mazon until March.
- Trial court found reasonable doubt on whether Kindelspire lived at Mazon but concluded the State proved he left his Morris residence and ultimately convicted him after holding the State need not prove a new established address.
- Appellate court reversed, holding the State failed to prove an essential element of the change-of-address offense (establishment of a new fixed residence or temporary domicile).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State proved Kindelspire violated section 6 by failing to report after leaving his Morris residence | State (below) argued defendant moved from Morris to Mazon and failed to register the new address within three days | Kindelspire argued State failed to prove he had established a new address in Mazon (required element for change-of-address) | Reversed: conviction vacated because State failed to prove establishment of a new fixed residence/temporary domicile needed for change-of-address offense |
| Whether State may rely on a different statutory theory on appeal (fixed-address provision vs. change-of-address) | On appeal the State asserted Count I could be treated as a fixed-residence (ceased to have fixed residence) violation | Kindelspire argued State forfeited that theory because it was not raised below and indictment did not allege it | Court held State forfeited the alternative theory and could not shift theory on appeal; due process bars new theory |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- People v. O'Neal, 104 Ill. 2d 399 (waiver/forfeiture rules apply to the State)
- People v. Harris, 333 Ill. App. 3d 741 (change of address and time at new address are elements of section 6 offense)