People v. Killion, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 911

Reyna Killion pleaded guilty (Feb 2, 2016) to assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1)) as part of a plea agreement; court imposed formal probation with domestic-violence terms under Penal Code § 1203.097 for a 36‑month minimum.
On April 7, 2017 (after ~14–15 months of probation), Killion moved to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor and to terminate probation early, alleging completion of a 52‑week domestic violence program and compliance with probation.
The trial court granted the reduction to a misdemeanor and converted formal probation to summary probation, but denied termination of probation, finding it lacked jurisdiction under § 1203.097(a)(1) to shorten the statutorily required 36‑month term.
The court reasoned § 1203.097 is a specific statute requiring a minimum 36‑month term for domestic‑violence probationers that overrides the general modification authority in § 1203.3.
The Court of Appeal reviewed the statutory-interpretation issue de novo and concluded § 1203.097 governs initial sentencing but does not strip the court of later remedial authority under § 1203.3 to terminate probation upon a showing that the ends of justice will be served.
The appellate court reversed the denial of the motion to terminate probation and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion under § 1203.3; it expressed no view on how discretion should be exercised on remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1203.097(a)(1) precludes a court from terminating or shortening a domestic‑violence probation term later under § 1203.3	The People argued the statute requires a mandatory 36‑month probation term and thus limits the court’s subsequent authority to reduce or terminate probation early	Killion argued § 1203.097 only prescribes the initial minimum probation term at sentencing and does not remove remedial relief available under § 1203.3	The court held § 1203.097 does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to terminate probation later under § 1203.3; remanded for exercise of discretion under § 1203.3

People v. Butler, 105 Cal.App.3d 585 (court may terminate probation when ends of justice served)
People v. Camp, 233 Cal.App.4th 461 (statutes governing revocation/modification of mandatory sentences do not restrict termination power)
Warden v. State Bar, 21 Cal.4th 628 (legislative awareness of existing law considered in statutory interpretation)
Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 38 Cal.4th 1139 (legislature does not intend to overturn long‑established principles without clear expression)
Phelps v. Stostad, 16 Cal.4th 23 (standard of review for statutory interpretation)