People v. Kidd
2013 IL App (2d) 120088
Ill. App. Ct.2013Background
- On March 7, 2010, Meredith Castro was found dead at home; defendant Jason Kidd had been with her the prior evening and admitted they used cocaine and marijuana.
- Autopsy and toxicology showed lethal morphine levels and cocaine/metabolite consistent with earlier use; Dr. Denton concluded death from cocaine and opiate intoxication; defense expert opined morphine was ingested after defendant went to bed.
- Defendant was indicted for drug-induced homicide for "knowingly delivering cocaine" to Castro, which allegedly caused her death; he was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.
- At trial the court gave IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15 (causation) and IPI No. 7.27 (drug-induced homicide) and the accountability instruction; the court gave only the third paragraph of IPI No. 17.05A (definition of "deliver") and refused defense-proffered proximate-cause instructions.
- The jury requested the autopsy/toxicology and received it during deliberations; it returned a guilty verdict.
- On appeal defendant argued (1) the court erred in refusing his proximate-cause instructions and (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to tender the full IPI delivery definition; the court affirmed on instruction refusal but found ineffective assistance meriting a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by refusing defendant's proximate-cause instructions | IPI No. 7.15 correctly states causation; delivered instruction unnecessary and would confuse foreseeability with causation | Proffered instructions were required because evidence conflicted on causation and foreseeability | Refused instructions were not erroneous; IPI No. 7.15 adequately explained proximate cause |
| Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not tendering full definition of "deliver" (IPI No. 17.05A) | State argued facts supported delivery by Kidd and omitted paragraphs were unnecessary | Failure to tender full definition deprived jury guidance on constructive/joint possession; reasonable probability of different outcome | Counsel was ineffective under Strickland; prejudice established because jury could have found no delivery; conviction reversed and remanded for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- People v. Boand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (drug-induced homicide incorporates "knowing" delivery element from Controlled Substances Act)
- People v. Faircloth, 234 Ill. App. 3d 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (explaining that a knowing delivery followed by death can support liability)
- People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75 (Ill. 2000) (possession principles: joint and constructive possession and proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319 (Ill. 2011) (clarifying prejudice standard under Strickland)
- People v. Drake, 288 Ill. App. 3d 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (constructive possession can be shown by control of premises and intent to control contraband)