People v. Khan
127 N.E.3d 592
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- In March 2013 an anonymous post on a Facebook page associated with North Central College read: “I bring a gun to school every day. Someday someone is going to p* me off and end up in a bag.” Defendant Aden Khan was later identified as the poster, arrested, tried, and convicted under the disorderly conduct statute prohibiting transmission of threats directed at persons at a school. He was sentenced to 30 months’ probation.
- At trial the State presented campus officials’ testimony that the post was taken as a serious threat, a detective’s investigation linking Khan to the page, and Khan’s admissions that he posted the message and had told a friend to deny involvement; Khan offered no evidence.
- Khan moved to dismiss pretrial, arguing the statute lacked a sufficient mens rea and therefore was unconstitutional (First Amendment and due process). The trial court denied the motion; the jury was instructed (erroneously in Khan’s favor) that the State had to prove intent to place recipients in reasonable apprehension of violence.
- The appellate court analyzed whether the statute requires a sufficient mental state (knowledge/intent) and whether the evidence proved a true threat and the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court held that the school-threat subsection is constitutional because it reaches only true threats and requires knowledge that the communication is a threat; it affirmed Khan’s conviction, finding the evidence sufficient to prove the message was a true threat and that Khan knew and intended the natural consequence of causing apprehension.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the school‑threat subsection of the disorderly conduct statute is facially unconstitutional for lack of a sufficient mens rea | The State: statute can be (and has been) construed to require knowledge that a communication is a true threat, so it is cabined to unprotected speech | Khan: statute criminalizes innocent speech by requiring only knowledge of transmission, not the intent to make recipients feel threatened; Elonis and Relerford support higher mens rea or invalidation | Held: statute constitutional — construed to require transmission of a true threat and defendant’s knowledge that the communication is a threat (knowledge or intent suffices) |
| Whether Khan was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of transmitting a true threat to persons at a school | The State: the post, context, prior similar juvenile posts, admissions, and reactions of school/campus safety support that the message was a true threat and Khan knew/ intended the natural consequence of causing fear | Khan: the post was immature venting; ambiguous language ("bag") could be innocuous; at most negligence/recklessness, not intent | Held: evidence sufficient — reasonable jury could find the post was a true threat and that Khan knew and intended (or at least knowingly transmitted) the threat |
Key Cases Cited
- Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 2001 (2015) (federal statute construed to require intent or knowledge that communication will be viewed as a threat)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (definition and treatment of “true threats” under the First Amendment)
- People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (2017) (Illinois Supreme Court invalidated overbroad stalking provision that criminalized communications that negligently cause fear)
- People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d 250 (2008) (statute struck for criminalizing innocent conduct where no criminal purpose required)
- People v. Madrigal, 241 Ill. 2d 463 (2011) (identity‑theft provision invalidated for covering a wide array of innocent conduct)
- People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563 (2016) (statutory construction principle: courts should construe statutes to preserve constitutionality when reasonably possible)