People v. Kendrick
2017 CO 82
Colo.2017Background
- Maurice Kendrick was charged with multiple counts (attempted murder, attempted assault, felony menacing, illegal discharge) after witnesses said he threatened women with a gun and fired at two occupied houses.
- Two trials occurred; the first ended in mistrial before the jury was sworn; the second also ended in mistrial after (1) a juror saw Kendrick in handcuffs in the courthouse and (2) the court ordered defense counsel to produce a confidential defense memorandum memorializing an interview of witness A.B., which the court then allowed defense counsel to use on cross-examination.
- The defense memorandum was labeled work product and contained pretrial statements by A.B. that were more favorable to the defense than her live testimony; A.B. also had earlier given inconsistent statements to police and a notarized letter to the court.
- After the second mistrial, Kendrick moved to disqualify the Fourth Judicial District Attorney’s Office and to appoint a special prosecutor under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-107(2), arguing disclosure of the defense work product and subsequent use at trial created special circumstances making a fair retrial by the office unlikely.
- The district court found the prior order to disclose the memorandum was erroneous, concluded the disclosure prejudiced the defense and created at least an appearance of unfairness, disqualified the entire District Attorney’s Office, and ordered a special prosecutor.
- The People sought interlocutory review; the Colorado Supreme Court treated the filing under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-12-102(2) and reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in disqualifying the office.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether disclosure/use of defense work product and ensuing events constituted "special circumstances" under § 20-1-107(2) justifying disqualification of the entire District Attorney’s Office | The People argued the disclosure did not create special circumstances because the prosecution already knew most of the memorandum’s contents from police statements, defense opening, and an expert report; no confidential strategy or unique information was imparted to the office | Kendrick argued the forced disclosure altered defense cross-examination, allowed the prosecutor to paint a picture of collusion and attack credibility using defense work product, and thus only a special prosecutor could level the playing field | Reversed: the court held the district court misapplied the law by relying on an "appearance" theory (no longer a valid ground) and that circumstances were not extreme enough to meet the high "special circumstances" standard for disqualification; no abuse of law by the DA shown |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879 (Colo. 2001) (district courts have discretion to disqualify prosecutors, historically considered appearance of impropriety)
- People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d 649 (Colo. 2006) (disqualification affirmed where prosecutor had a prior attorney–client relationship substantially related to the prosecution)
- People v. Perez, 201 P.3d 1220 (Colo. 2009) (appearance of impropriety is not a valid statutory basis for disqualification under § 20-1-107(2))
- People v. Loper, 241 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2010) ("special circumstances" must be extreme to justify disqualification)
- People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158 (Colo. 2011) (interlocutory appeal rule C.A.R. 4.1 is narrow; jurisdictional discussion relevant to interlocutory review)