34 Cal.App.5th 878
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Defendant Cody Adam Julian was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of lewd acts on a child and one count of sexual penetration of a child under ten based principally on Child 2’s testimony and denied sexual contact.
- The prosecution presented Dr. Anthony Urquiza as an expert on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS); he testified generally about CSAAS and additionally stated statistical rates of false allegations (approximately 1–8%, and in some testimony described rates as effectively zero in one Canadian study).
- Trial counsel did not object to Urquiza’s statistical testimony and on cross-examination elicited additional study discussion; the prosecutor referenced Urquiza’s statistics in closing.
- Defense counsel asked Detective Menghrajani whether he believed Child 2; the detective answered yes.
- The Court of Appeal held the statistical probability evidence went beyond permissible CSAAS scope, the detective’s credibility opinion was improper, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object; the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert statistical testimony about frequency of false child-abuse allegations | Urquiza’s statistics are relevant to explain typical disclosure behavior and rebut myths; admissible as part of CSAAS context | Statistical probability evidence goes beyond permissible CSAAS scope, improperly quantifies credibility and usurps jury’s role | Reversed: statistical probability testimony was inadmissible as CSAAS evidence and was prejudicial |
| Effect of statistical testimony on fairness of trial | Statistics simply contextualize typical child responses; did not determine guilt | Statistics invited jurors to infer guilt by probability, distracting from case evidence | Reversed: testimony deprived defendant of fair trial by substituting statistical inference for jury credibility determination |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to object to statistical testimony | No plain error; counsel’s choices were tactical | Failing to object to clearly inadmissible, highly prejudicial evidence fell below Strickland standard and was prejudicial given credibility dispute | Reversed: counsel ineffective; prejudice shown because case turned on witness credibility |
| Solicited opinion from detective about complainant's honesty | Detective’s view aided fact-finding and reflected investigative assessment | Officer’s opinion on complainant truthfulness was improper and usurped jury credibility function | Reversed: detective’s testimony that child was "honest" was improper and prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal.3d 1289 (1991) (CSAAS expert testimony admissible to rehabilitate a child witness but not to prove abuse occurred)
- People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319 (1968) (expert statistical evidence on probability of guilt may distract jury and supplant proper factfinding)
- People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385 (1988) (expert testimony may not state predictive conclusions that the jury should apply to decide whether abuse occurred)
- Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1998) (expert statistical testimony about child-truthfulness can render trial fundamentally unfair)
- In re Jones, 13 Cal.4th 552 (1996) (court discusses limits on expert testimony and the danger of unduly bolstering witness credibility)
- People v. Long, 126 Cal.App.4th 865 (2005) (expert cannot opine on whether a witness is telling the truth)
- People v. Sergill, 138 Cal.App.3d 34 (1982) (police officers’ opinions that a child is truthful are irrelevant and may usurp jury function)
- Powell v. State, 527 A.2d 276 (Del. 1987) (admission of expert percentage testimony about victims’ truthfulness deprived defendant of jury credibility determination)