2020 IL App (1st) 151946-U
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Defendant Giovann Jones was charged with home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault (and separately with predatory criminal sexual assault in another case); DNA and a signed confession linked him to the victim, who sustained vaginal tearing and heavy bleeding.
- The State initially offered a combined 30-year plea across cases, later mentioned a 28-year offer during court proceedings; defendant declined plea offers after a Rule 402 conference and delayed responses.
- A jury convicted Jones of home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault; at sentencing the court found great bodily harm, imposed consecutive 30-year terms, and applied truth-in-sentencing (requiring Jones to serve at least 85% of the home invasion sentence).
- Jones filed multiple pro se postconviction petitions; counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition raising claims including: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to advise about truth-in-sentencing, ineffective appellate counsel for not challenging the great-bodily-harm finding as a jury question, and ineffective postconviction assistance (e.g., failure to notarize affidavits and omit claims).
- The amended petition included affidavits from friends and his mother (two unnotarized initially); postconviction counsel later submitted a notarized revised affidavit for one witness and a Rule 651(c) certificate.
- The circuit court dismissed the amended petition at the second stage; Jones appealed and this court affirmed, holding Jones failed to make the required substantial showings and postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Jones that truth-in-sentencing could require serving 85% of the home-invasion sentence | Failure to advise about truth-in-sentencing is counselly omission regarding a collateral consequence and not constitutionally deficient; record rebuts prejudice because Jones rejected plea offers despite risk | Counsel did not inform Jones about 85% truth-in-sentencing; Jones would have accepted the 28-year plea if informed | Dismissed — truth-in-sentencing is a collateral consequence, so no deficient performance; prejudice not shown given Jones’ prior rejections of plea offers |
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the jury (not the judge) must decide great bodily harm under Apprendi/Alleyne | Appellate counsel reasonably omitted a meritless claim; Illinois precedent rejected Apprendi challenges in this context | Appellate counsel should have raised an Apprendi-based challenge; Alleyne supports submitting great-bodily-harm facts to the jury because they affect mandatory minimums | Dismissed — counsel not deficient for omitting an argument contrary to prevailing Illinois authority; claim fails |
| Whether postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance (e.g., failed to notarize affidavits, omitted facts/claims) | Counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate, creating a rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance; the record does not rebut it and shows attempts to cure affidavit defects | Counsel failed to notarize the mother’s affidavit, omitted critical factual allegations and meritorious claims from pro se filings | Dismissed — presumption of reasonable assistance not overcome; counsel substantially complied with Rule 651(c) and omissions were not unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (statutory fact that increases penalty beyond prescribed range must be found by a jury)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (extends Apprendi to facts that increase mandatory minimums)
- People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365 (1999) (distinguishes direct versus collateral consequences of sentencing)
- People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140 (2013) (prejudice standard for rejected plea offers requires showing defendant would have accepted the offer and court would have accepted it)
- People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006 (postconviction counsel is required to provide reasonable, not effective, assistance under the Act)
- People v. Castano, 392 Ill. App. 3d 956 (2009) (application of sentencing-credit statutes is a collateral consequence)
- People v. Frison, 365 Ill. App. 3d 932 (2006) (same: truth-in-sentencing and credit issues are collateral consequences)