People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810

On January 1, 2019, police stopped a car driven by Teranza Jones and found two .40-caliber cartridges in the glove compartment under the owner's manual. Jones had a prior felony (identity theft, 2002).
Officer Wakeland testified about finding the ammunition and that Jones said the bullets belonged to her husband.
Jones testified she did not know the ammunition was in the car and assumed it belonged to her husband; her husband testified he kept a gun in the car trunk and stored the magazine/ammunition in the glove box and had a FOID card.
During deliberations the jury asked for the definition of "knowingly." The parties and trial court agreed to tell the jury to use the word's plain meaning rather than give IPI Criminal No. 5.01B because the IPI's language about "awareness of the substantial probability" could lower the standard.
The jury convicted Jones of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon; she was sentenced to the two-year mandatory minimum. The appellate court affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	State's Argument	Jones's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to prove "knowing" possession	Evidence (registered owner driving car, ammo in glove box, Jones's statement that bullets were husband’s, husband’s testimony) permitted inference of constructive possession and knowledge	Evidence was circumstantial and insufficient; Jones denied knowledge and there was no direct proof she knew the ammunition was present	Affirmed — viewing evidence in light most favorable to State, a rational juror could find constructive possession and knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt
Jury instruction on "knowingly" (plain error / duty to instruct)	No plain error; parties and court reasonably declined IPI 5.01B because its last sentence could lower the mens rea and likely aid conviction	Trial court erred by failing to give IPI 5.01B in response to jury question; a clear IPI definition was required	Affirmed — no plain error; parties invited/accepted the response and IPI 5.01B would likely have harmed Jones given the facts
Ineffective assistance for not insisting on IPI 5.01B	Defense counsel's choice was reasonable trial strategy to avoid IPI language that might reduce the mens rea requirement	Counsel erred or was mistaken in law; failing to request IPI 5.01B prejudiced Jones	Affirmed — counsel’s decision was tactical and not objectively unreasonable under Strickland; no prejudice shown

People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311 (constructive possession and inference of knowledge from control of premises)
People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
People v. Leib, 2022 IL 126645 (knowledge is the mental element of an offense)
People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75 (knowledge and possession are factual questions for the trier of fact)
People v. Embry, 20 Ill. 2d 331 (knowledge is a jury question)
People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217 (duty to clarify law when jury expresses confusion)
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (forfeiture of instruction error absent objection/posttrial motion)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance standard)
People v. Mims, 403 Ill. App. 3d 884 (counsel may reasonably decline an instruction that would harm the defense)
People v. Lowry, 354 Ill. App. 3d 760 (contrast where counsel’s confusion about jury question caused deficient performance)
In re Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d 226 (de novo review appropriate when resolving purely legal/statutory questions)