People v. Jones
497 Mich. 155
Mich.2014Background
- Defendant drove ~80 mph in a 35 mph zone, changed lanes, caused a chain collision that killed one driver; charged with reckless driving causing death (MCL 257.626(4)).
- Defendant requested a jury instruction on the misdemeanor lesser offense, moving violation causing death (MCL 257.601d); circuit court granted the request despite statutory prohibition in MCL 257.626(5).
- Prosecution appealed; Court of Appeals (split) affirmed, holding MCL 257.626(5) unconstitutional under separation of powers and the right to jury trial. The prosecution sought leave to appeal.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted review on three questions: (1) whether a statute barring consideration of a necessarily included lesser offense violates separation of powers; (2) whether MCL 257.626(5) violates the right to jury trial; and (3) whether MCL 257.601d is necessarily included in MCL 257.626(4).
- The Supreme Court assumed (by parties’ concession) that moving violation causing death is a necessarily included lesser offense but held that MCL 257.626(5) validly bars instructing a jury on that misdemeanor when reckless driving causing death is charged.
- Court of Appeals’ judgment reversed; case remanded with instructions to vacate the circuit court’s order requiring the lesser-offense jury instruction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a legislative provision barring instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense violates separation of powers | Legislature may not restrict courts’ exclusive authority over practice and procedure; deciding what instructions juries may hear is judicial | Legislature may create substantive rules defining which offenses a jury may consider; MCL 257.626(5) is a permissible substantive exception | Statute is substantive and within legislative authority; no separation-of-powers violation — Legislature may bar jury instruction on moving violation causing death |
| Whether MCL 257.626(5) violates defendant’s right to jury trial by forbidding a lesser-offense instruction | Barred instruction denies jury consideration of a legally available offense and penalizes choice of jury trial; infringes Sixth Amendment | No Supreme Court precedent requires jury consideration of lesser included offenses outside capital context; legislature can limit jury options; judges as factfinders are presumed aware of the law | No Sixth Amendment violation found; no general constitutional right to have jury consider lesser included offenses (outside limited capital context) |
| Whether moving violation causing death is a necessarily included lesser offense of reckless driving causing death | Parties conceded it is necessarily included (so instruction should be available under MCL 768.32(1)) | Statutory text and definitions could suggest distinctions (see concurrence); but for majority the concession controls | Court proceeded on concession and held that even if necessarily included, MCL 257.626(5) expressly precludes jury instruction on that lesser offense; concurrence would decide it is not necessarily included on statutory-definition grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335 (interpreting MCL 768.32(1) and holding only necessarily included lesser offenses qualify for instruction)
- McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15 (discussing limits of legislative intrusion into judicial practice and procedure)
- Beck v Alabama, 447 US 625 (1980) (in capital cases, jury must be able to consider lesser included offenses to avoid arbitrary sentencing)
- Neder v United States, 527 US 1 (1999) (failure to instruct on elements can deprive defendants of fair trial protections)
- People v Piasecki, 333 Mich 122 (discussing scope of legislative power over substantive criminal law)