People v. Jones
2021 IL App (4th) 190751-U
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background:
- Defendant Teranza Jones was stopped on January 1, 2019; police searched her car and found two unfired .40-caliber rounds in the glovebox.
- A certified copy of defendant’s prior felony conviction was admitted; she was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon.
- Defendant testified she did not know the bullets were in the glovebox and said they belonged to her husband; husband Lee Brown testified he stored ammunition in the glovebox and had a FOID card.
- During deliberations the jury asked for a definition of “knowingly.” The court consulted IPI 5.01B but, after discussion, sent back a note instructing the jury to give “knowingly” its plain meaning in the jury’s common understanding.
- The jury convicted; the trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence and that the court’s instruction (and defense counsel’s failure to object) deprived her of a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding that (1) viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supported a finding that defendant knowingly possessed the ammunition, and (2) the court properly responded to the jury and defense counsel’s agreement to the plain-meaning instruction was a reasonable tactical choice under Strickland.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence to prove "knowing" possession | The evidence (bullets in glovebox in a car registered to defendant; defendant immediately said bullets belonged to her husband; husband testified defendant knew he kept guns/ammo in the car) supports a reasonable inference of knowledge | Defendant lacked actual knowledge of the bullets; her testimony that she didn’t know should create reasonable doubt | Affirmed: under Jackson/Collins deference, a rational trier could find defendant knowingly possessed the ammunition (constructive possession and shared control permitted inference of knowledge) |
| Jury instruction / ineffective assistance regarding definition of "knowingly" | The court and parties reasonably addressed the jury question; plain-meaning instruction was appropriate; defense counsel reasonably chose not to use IPI language which could have highlighted “substantial probability” wording detrimental to defendant | The trial court improperly declined the IPI definition; counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the court’s plain-meaning response | Affirmed: court’s response was proper; counsel’s acquiescence was a strategic, objectively reasonable decision under Strickland; no plain error |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187 (2006) (appellate court’s role is not to retry the defendant when reviewing sufficiency)
- People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237 (1985) (adopts Jackson standard for sufficiency review)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (evidence is sufficient if any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1 (2011) (courts must view evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution and allow reasonable inferences)
- People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532 (1999) (credibility determinations are for the trier of fact)
- People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194 (2004) (convictions reversed only where evidence is so unsatisfactory that it raises reasonable doubt)
- People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1 (1989) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element)
- People v. Brown, 327 Ill. App. 3d 816 (2002) (elements of unlawful possession by a felon; knowledge may be actual or constructive)
- People v. Hester, 271 Ill. App. 3d 954 (1995) (shared immediate and exclusive control supports possession)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- People v. Lowry, 354 Ill. App. 3d 760 (2004) (trial court has duty to answer juror questions; counsel’s failure to offer proper instruction may be nonstrategic)
- People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308 (2002) (strategic judgments do not by themselves establish ineffective assistance)
- People v. Mims, 403 Ill. App. 3d 884 (2010) (choice of jury instructions is normally tactical)