People v. Johnson
2021 IL App (3d) 180357
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- In 1994 Philip Johnson (age 16) pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea to first-degree murder (for Frances Buck) and second-degree murder (for his father) and received consecutive terms totaling 110 years. The plea agreement included the State's recommendation and waived mitigation evidence and a presentence investigation report.
- At the plea hearing the State advised that a trial conviction on original charges could carry a mandatory natural-life sentence without parole; the agreed terms produced a discretionary, extended-term aggregate sentence (90 + 20 years).
- Pretrial psychological and school records attached to the postconviction petition showed learning disabilities, a borderline verbal IQ (77), ADHD, repeated grades, and extensive physical and emotional abuse by the father; those exhibits argued the defendant’s youth and background mitigated culpability.
- In 2017 Johnson obtained leave to file a successive postconviction petition claiming his de facto life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama and progeny because the court never considered his youth and attendant circumstances.
- The trial court dismissed the petition, holding a fully negotiated guilty plea waived the claim. The appellate court reversed, concluding (1) Johnson could not have waived Miller before Miller existed, (2) his 110-year sentence is a de facto life sentence (>40 years), and (3) the record shows the sentencing court did not consider youth factors — remanding for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a fully negotiated guilty plea waived a Miller-based Eighth Amendment challenge | State: guilty plea waives constitutional claims and sentencing challenges (Jackson, Townsell). | Johnson: Miller is a novel rule decided after his plea, so he could not knowingly waive it. | Court: No waiver — defendant could not have waived Miller-based rights that did not exist at plea time. |
| Whether the 110-year aggregate sentence is a de facto life sentence requiring Miller analysis | State: sentence was discretionary and agreed to, not a mandatory life sentence. | Johnson: 110 years >40 years is a de facto life sentence and triggers Miller/Holman protections. | Court: 110 years is a de facto life sentence; sentencing court failed to consider youth factors; sentence violates Eighth Amendment. |
| Appropriate remedy when Miller applies to a negotiated-plea sentence | State: (conceded) if Miller applies remand for resentencing is appropriate. | Dissent: defendant must move to withdraw the plea; vacatur and plea withdrawal — not just resentencing. | Court: Accepting State’s concession, reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing under Miller/Holman statutory scheme. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (juveniles categorically different for death penalty)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (barred life without parole for juveniles in nonhomicide cases)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (prohibited mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles; required consideration of youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller announced a substantive rule and applies retroactively)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Illinois: mandatory or discretionary life for juveniles unconstitutional unless court considered youth/Miller factors)
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (defined de facto life as >40 years and applied Miller/Holman factors)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (distinguished by court as involving elements/jury rights waived by plea)
- People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286 (guilty plea generally waives claims under Apprendi framework)
- People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543 (reaffirming that negotiated pleas waive collateral constitutional claims)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (a plea is not rendered involuntary by later judicial decisions changing applicable law)