People v. Johnson
2017 IL App (4th) 160920
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Octavius Johnson pleaded guilty in Nov. 2014 to two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church under a partially negotiated plea: State would dismiss other charges and recommend a 13-year sentence cap. The statutory range was 4–15 years.
- At sentencing the court imposed 11 years (below the 13-year cap) after listing mitigating and aggravating factors and crediting rehabilitation efforts.
- Johnson filed a pro se postplea motion seeking a sentence reduction; counsel converted it into a motion to withdraw the guilty plea alleging the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The trial court denied the motion and also said the 11-year sentence was appropriate.
- On appeal Johnson argued for the first time that the trial court relied on improper sentencing factors (compensation and societal harm) and sought plain-error review; the State conceded Johnson was entitled to one additional day of custody credit and $5 per diem credit.
- The Fourth District reviewed whether improper-sentence challenges to partially negotiated pleas must be preceded by plea withdrawal (circuit split exists) and whether the sentencing error constituted second-prong plain error.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Johnson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant who entered a partially negotiated plea must first withdraw the plea to challenge a sentence based on improper sentencing factors | Rule 604(d) and related rules/procedures should be read to require withdrawal for negotiated pleas; Evans/Linder principles protect plea bargains | Improper-sentence claims (distinct from excessive-sentence claims) are not barred by Rule 604(d); defendant may raise them without withdrawing plea | Court held a defendant need not withdraw a partially negotiated plea to raise an improper-sentence claim and declined to follow districts that required withdrawal |
| Whether the trial court committed reversible/plain error by considering improper aggravating factors (compensation and threatened societal harm) | (State did not contest merits) | Trial court relied on factors inherent in the offense, which are improper aggravators; seeks plain-error review to overcome forfeiture | Court found the trial court considered improper factors and, given multiple improper factors and their apparent effect, reversed sentence under second-prong plain-error and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether Johnson is entitled to an extra day of custody credit and $5 per diem | State conceded the extra day and $5 | Argued he was held in custody starting Oct 22, 2013 and is entitled to credit for that day | Court accepted concession: remanded to add one day of credit and $5 per diem |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996) (defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence must withdraw plea before challenging sentence as excessive)
- People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999) (Evans reasoning extends to partially negotiated pleas with sentencing caps; such pleas waive challenges that sentence is merely excessive)
- People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997) (Evans does not bar challenges to sentences that are void or statutorily unauthorized)
- People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998) (following Williams: challenges to statutory authority or improper sentencing need not be preceded by plea withdrawal)
- People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256 (1986) (court may not use factors inherent in the offense as aggravating factors at sentencing)
- People v. McCain, 248 Ill. App. 3d 844 (1993) (compensation in drug transactions is generally inherent in the offense and not a proper aggravator)
- People v. Hutchcraft, 215 Ill. App. 3d 533 (1991) (day-of-arrest and day-of-disposition both count for custody credit)