People v. Johnson
2017 IL App (4th) 160920
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Octavius Lorenzo Johnson pleaded guilty (partially negotiated plea) to two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a church; State agreed to dismiss other counts and recommended a sentence cap of 13 years.
- At sentencing the court imposed 11 years (below the 13-year cap but below the statutory maximum of 15), citing mitigating rehabilitation and several aggravating factors.
- Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking sentence reduction, then (with counsel) moved to withdraw his plea alleging the plea was not knowing and voluntary; the trial court denied the motion and stated it still viewed the 11-year sentence as appropriate.
- On appeal Johnson argued (for the first time) the trial court relied on improper sentencing factors; he conceded forfeiture and sought plain-error review; the State conceded one day of sentence and $5 per diem credit was omitted.
- The appellate court addressed (1) whether a defendant who entered a partially negotiated plea must withdraw the plea to challenge a sentence as based on improper factors, and (2) whether the sentencing court actually relied on improper factors and whether that error warranted relief.
- The court held improper sentencing factors were considered (compensation and societal harm inherent in the offense) and that the errors constituted second-prong plain error; it reversed and remanded for resentencing and awarded one additional day of credit and $5 per diem.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Johnson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant who entered a partially negotiated plea must first withdraw the plea to challenge sentence as based on improper sentencing factors | Evans/Linder require withdrawal for challenges to negotiated sentences; this should extend to all sentence challenges | Improper-factor challenges are distinct from excessive-sentence claims and need not be raised by withdrawing plea | Court held a defendant need not withdraw a partially negotiated plea to raise an improper-sentence claim (followed this court’s precedent) |
| Whether the trial court relied on improper sentencing factors at sentencing | Did not meaningfully contest on appeal | Trial court considered compensation and societal harm as aggravating factors—both inherent in drug offenses | Court found the trial court improperly considered compensation and "threatened serious harm" (societal harm) as aggravators |
| Whether the forfeited improper-factor claim may be reviewed under plain-error doctrine | Argued forfeiture should bar review (invited this court to follow other districts) | Sought second-prong plain-error review because the error affected fairness and integrity of the process | Court found second-prong plain error: multiple improper factors affected fundamental fairness; reversed and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether defendant is entitled to additional presentence custody credit and per diem | State conceded one omitted day and $5 per diem | Sought one additional day and $5 per diem for arrest day | Court accepted concession and directed trial court to add one day of credit and $5 per diem |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Evans, 174 Ill.2d 320 (1996) (defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence must withdraw plea before challenging sentence as excessive)
- People v. Linder, 186 Ill.2d 67 (1999) (Evans doctrine extended to partially negotiated pleas that include a sentencing cap)
- People v. Williams, 179 Ill.2d 331 (1997) (challenge to a sentence that is statutorily unauthorized is not barred by Evans even without plea withdrawal)
- People v. Wilson, 181 Ill.2d 409 (1998) (confirms Williams: challenges to a court’s statutory authority to impose sentence not barred by Evans)
- People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill.2d 256 (1986) (trial court may not consider factors inherent in the offense as aggravators)
- People v. McCain, 248 Ill. App.3d 844 (1993) (compensation in drug transactions is generally inherent to the offense and not a proper aggravator)
- People v. Abdelhadi, 973 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. App. 2d 2012) (trial court’s consideration of improper aggravators generally requires remand unless such consideration was insignificant)
- People v. Hutchcraft, 215 Ill. App.3d 533 (1991) (defendant is entitled to credit for any part of a day in custody; both first and last days counted)