People v. Jarquan B. (In Re Jarquan B.)
102 N.E.3d 182
Ill.2017Background
- Jarquan B., adjudicated delinquent for misdemeanor criminal trespass (Feb 26, 2015), was sentenced to 12 months’ supervision with a warned possibility of DJJ commitment if probation were violated.
- After multiple probation violations and failures to appear, the State petitioned to revoke probation; respondent admitted violations beginning Nov 17, 2015.
- The Illinois General Assembly amended 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b) effective Jan 1, 2016, to restrict DJJ commitments to minors for offenses punishable by adult imprisonment in the penitentiary system (effectively excluding many misdemeanors).
- Respondent was resentenced on revocation of probation on April 26, 2016, and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ); he appealed, arguing the 2016 amendment precluded DJJ commitment for a misdemeanor.
- The State and courts relied on 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4), which allows a court revoking probation to impose "any other sentence that was available under Section 5-710 at the time of the initial sentence." The trial and appellate courts upheld the DJJ commitment; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2016 amendment to §5-710(1)(b) barred DJJ commitment on respondent’s Apr 26, 2016 resentencing | Respondent: the post‑sentencing amendment forbids DJJ commitment for misdemeanors and therefore applied to his Apr 2016 resentencing | State: §5-720(4) authorizes imposing any sentence that was available under §5-710 at the time of initial sentence (Feb 26, 2015), so DJJ commitment remained available | Held: §5-720(4) controls; because DJJ commitment was an available sentence at the time of the initial sentence, the trial court could commit respondent to DJJ despite the 2016 amendment |
| Whether the appeal was moot and if a moot-case exception applies | Respondent: sentence served so appeal moot | State: public‑interest exception applicable | Held: Although the sentence had been served, the court applied the public‑interest exception and reached the merits |
| If §5-720(4) and amended §5-710(1)(b) conflict, which controls | Respondent: the amendment should govern all sentencing after its effective date | State: §5-720(4) is a specific provision that preserves sentencing options available at initial sentencing | Held: Even if characterized as a conflict, §5-720(4) is the more specific provision governing probation-revocation resentencing and prevails; statutes construed harmoniously in any event |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994 (public‑interest exception to mootness, juvenile detention importance)
- People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551 (upholding statutory distinction re: sentencing timing)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (defendant entitled to be resentenced under new scheme when original sentence vacated)
- People v. Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d 130 (upon probation revocation, court may impose any sentence appropriate for original offense)
- People v. Denier, 76 Ill. App. 3d 214 (defendant sentenced before amendment may not elect resentencing under later amendatory act)
- Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470 (canon: specific statutory provision governs over general)