People v. Janusz
162 N.E.3d 1027
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- Richard Janusz was indicted on 30 counts (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and manufacturing child pornography) based on sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, R.M., occurring 2010–2014. He was arrested August 1, 2014.
- Multiple continuances were entered between arrest and arraignment; Janusz was not arraigned until April 21, 2016 (630 days after arrest). He had filed a speedy-trial demand August 19, 2014.
- Many pre-arraignment continuances were entered by agreement or at defense request; defense counsel repeatedly sought time to review discovery, retain experts, and address concurrent civil matters.
- Jury trial began May 7, 2018. R.M. testified to repeated digital, oral, and penile/anal contact; medical and detective testimony corroborated. The jury convicted Janusz of 11 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and 4 counts of manufacturing child pornography.
- Janusz was sentenced to 101 years’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising (1) a statutory speedy-trial claim based on the delayed arraignment and (2) ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s failure to request a lesser-included-offense instruction (aggravated criminal sexual abuse).
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Janusz’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Janusz’s statutory speedy-trial right was violated by arraignment 630 days after arrest | Delays were occasioned by defendant (requests/agreements); section 103-5 tolls for defendant-caused delays | Arraignment delay beyond 120 days is unreasonable; without arraignment defendant could not meaningfully agree to continuances, so pre-arraignment delays cannot be charged to him | Affirmed: court found continuances were by agreement or defense request, tolled the 120-day period; statute does not implicitly require arraignment within 120 days and pre-arraignment delays can be charged to defendant |
| Whether trial counsel’s failure to request a lesser-included-offense instruction (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) violated the Sixth Amendment | Trial strategy and credibility findings support counsel’s conduct; victim’s testimony and defendant’s statements supported penetration, so no prejudice from omission | Counsel failed to discuss/tender the instruction and deprived Janusz of the right to decide whether to seek it; omission was prejudicial because evidence supported only sexual conduct (not penetration) on some counts | Affirmed: no ineffective assistance. Even assuming deficiency, no prejudice—victim testimony and admissions allowed a reasonable jury to infer digital sexual penetration, so no reasonable probability of a different verdict |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380 (2006) (section 103-5 measures time from custody to trial; delays that move trial outside 120 days are chargeable)
- People v. Bauman, 2012 IL App (2d) 110544 (speedy-trial statute implements constitutional right; construed liberally for defendant)
- People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (1998) (trial court’s allocation of responsibility for delay reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530 (2002) (statutory speedy-trial period begins on date custody begins)
- People v. Hillier, 392 Ill. App. 3d 66 (2009) (jury may infer sexual penetration from testimony describing rubbing/handling)
- People v. Foster, 2020 IL App (2d) 170683 (victim’s description of touching may support inference of digital penetration)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- People v. Boyd, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (2006) (delay from defendant’s failure to proceed with arraignment chargeable to defendant)