2016 COA 69
Colo. Ct. App.2016Background
- In August 2012 Janis stabbed Farest Logan and was charged with first‑degree assault; she asserted self‑defense and testified at trial. Surveillance confirmed the stabbing.
- Janis suffered from severe PTSD and was in custody throughout trial. Defense counsel requested a private signal so Janis could be excused if retraumatized.
- During Logan's live testimony defense counsel asked that Janis be removed; the court excused the jury and Janis was physically removed without the court engaging Janis directly on the record.
- The prosecutor and defense counsel repeatedly told the court (but not Janis on the record) that she was voluntarily leaving; Janis did not personally waive her right on the record and made no statements before removal.
- Janis was absent for Logan’s testimony (a key witness whose testimony contradicted Janis's account); after remand the court found the absence may have impaired confrontation and cross‑examination.
- Trial court denied Janis’s motion to suppress (officer stopped and handcuffed her after a stabbing radio call; she told officers she had a knife and produced it). Appellate court affirmed suppression ruling but reversed the conviction due to defendant’s absence.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Janis’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense counsel may waive an in‑custody defendant’s right to be present at a critical stage by stating the defendant does not wish to be present | Counsel’s representation that Janis did not want to remain and statements on the record suffice as waiver | Only the defendant can personally waive the right when in custody; counsel cannot waive it for her | Reversed — counsel cannot waive an in‑custody defendant’s right; the record lacked a personal on‑the‑record waiver, so removal was error |
| Whether Janis’s absence during Logan’s testimony was harmless | Evidence of stabbing was overwhelming; any absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Absence impaired confrontation, communication with counsel, and cross‑examination; self‑defense was a live issue | Error was plain and prejudicial; reversal required |
| Whether Janis voluntarily absented herself from trial while in custody (waiver by conduct) | Janis voluntarily chose to leave; counsel’s statements show voluntary departure | A defendant in custody cannot effect a voluntary absence because custody removes control over presence | Rejected — custody makes voluntary absence waiver inapplicable; no personal waiver shown |
| Whether statements and the knife should have been suppressed (Fourth/Fifth Amendment) | Stop, handcuffing, and question about weapons triggered Miranda and unlawful seizure; evidence should be suppressed | Investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion; officer’s question fell within the public‑safety exception to Miranda | Affirmed — stop and limited restraints were reasonable; public‑safety exception applied to question about weapons; suppression was not required |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Luu, 841 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1992) (defendant has constitutional right to be present at critical stages; confrontation protection)
- United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1985) (distinguishes rule‑based presence from constitutional right; Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 analysis)
- People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984) (fundamental rights like presence require personal waiver by defendant)
- People v. Campbell, 785 P.2d 153 (Colo. App. 1989) (counsel cannot waive in‑custody defendant’s right to be present; record must show personal waiver)
- Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (U.S. 1912) (defendant not in custody who voluntarily absents himself waives presence)
- Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (U.S. 1973) (waiver of presence may be effective without court advisement in some circumstances)
- New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (U.S. 1984) (public‑safety exception to Miranda permits immediate on‑scene questions about weapons)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires advisement)