People v. Jackson
2017 Ill. App. LEXIS 576
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Carlos A. Jackson, a convicted sex offender, was charged with unlawful failure to register/report within 90 days after his last registration (last registration: Nov. 12, 2013; arrest Feb. 17, 2014).
- The information mistakenly cited 730 ILCS 150/3(b) and used the term “register” instead of the section 6 statutory term “report,” though the factual allegations tracked a section 6 violation.
- At a bench trial the State introduced the Nov. 12, 2013 registration form; the defendant admitted he knew of the 90‑day reporting requirement but believed he had a 10‑day grace period.
- Trial court convicted and sentenced defendant to three years’ imprisonment.
- On appeal defendant argued (1) the charging instrument was defective and voided the conviction, and (2) the 2014 SORA statutory scheme is unconstitutional (punitive/ex post facto and due process challenges), including a facial challenge to the park‑loitering ban.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of charging instrument (wrong statutory citation and terminology) | State: error was formal not fatal; facts put defendant on notice | Jackson: citation to wrong section and wrong term rendered conviction void for lack of jurisdiction | Affirmed: error was formal; defendant first raised issue on appeal and showed no prejudice; court retained jurisdiction |
| Whether SORA has become punitive / ex post facto problem | State: prior cases upheld SORA; no ex post facto claim here | Jackson: 2014 amendments increased burdens so SORA is punitive and warrants reexamination under Mendoza‑Martinez | Court declined to decide ex post facto/punitiveness in this appeal (no ex post facto claim) |
| Procedural due process — lack of mechanism to remove low‑risk offenders | State: SORA provides adequate safeguards; registration burdens are not so severe to require additional procedures | Jackson: no process to seek exemption or removal despite differing recidivism risks | Rejected: majority followed appellate precedent finding no procedural due process violation for the challenged provisions (except park rule) |
| Substantive due process — park loitering restriction (720 ILCS 5/11‑9.4‑1) | State: restriction rationally related to protecting children from sex offenders | Jackson: statute is overbroad, criminalizes innocent conduct and lacks risk‑tailoring | Court: park loitering prohibition is facially unconstitutional; other challenged SORA provisions upheld as rationally related to public protection |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178 (Ill. 2004) (upheld earlier SORA provisions against ex post facto/punitive challenges)
- People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413 (Ill. 2000) (analyzing SORA under Mendoza‑Martinez factors in ex post facto context)
- People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23 (Ill. 1976) (an information is sufficient if it apprised accused of the precise offense with enough specificity)
- People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245 (Ill. 1996) (charging instrument does not confer subject matter jurisdiction; jurisdictional grant is constitutional)
- People v. McBrien, 144 Ill. App. 3d 489 (Ill. App. 1986) (incorrect statutory citation is a formal defect requiring prejudice to warrant reversal)
- People v. Melton, 282 Ill. App. 3d 408 (Ill. App. 1996) (formal defects in charging documents require a showing of prejudice to reverse)
- In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (Ill. 2003) (rational basis standard for substantive due process where no fundamental right implicated)
- Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing procedural and substantive due process frameworks for sex‑offender regulations)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (U.S. 1963) (factors to determine whether a statute is punitive rather than regulatory)