People v. Irving CA4/3
G060195
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 22, 2021Background:
- Late-night collision in downtown San Jose: Daniel Irving drove a Volkswagen Jetta through a well-lit crosswalk and struck pedestrian Edgar Cantoran, who was in the crosswalk when a “do not walk” signal was flashing (witnesses disagreed whether entry was slightly early or against the signal).
- Irving admitted drinking and smoking cannabis hours before the crash; on-scene breath tests showed BAC ~0.13–0.14; later blood test showed .097% BAC and measurable THC metabolites.
- Investigating officers found an open alcohol container and cannabis items in Irving’s car; emergency responders transported Cantoran, who suffered severe brain injury, two-week coma, seizures, and long-term cognitive/behavioral impairment (great bodily injury).
- Prosecution presented an accident reconstruction expert estimating Irving’s speed between ~38–46 mph (possibly higher); defense reconstruction expert produced lower minimum-speed estimates (~35–36 mph) but acknowledged a possible higher maximum.
- Charged with DUI causing injury (Veh. Code §23153 subdivisions (a), (b), (g)), alleged great bodily injury enhancements and a prior DUI; jury convicted on counts (a) and (b), found the great-bodily-injury enhancement true, acquitted on (g); court imposed 6 years 4 months in prison.
- Irving appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence of causation, (2) trial court improperly limited cross-examination of the prosecution’s reconstruction expert, and (3) sentencing court erroneously denied probation based on presumed ineligibility / ineffective assistance of counsel.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence (causation) | Evidence showed Irving speeding and impaired; proximate cause established. | Argues lack of proof he proximately caused Cantoran’s injuries; pedestrian entry against signal was unforeseeable intervening cause. | Affirmed: substantial evidence supported proximate causation; pedestrian conduct was a foreseeable, dependent intervening cause. |
| Denial of cross-examination of expert on "primary/associated factors" | Excluding legal-conclusion opinions prevented expert from usurping jury role; court allowed technical testimony on speed/measurements. | Sought to cross-examine expert about his reports assigning primary/associated collision factors (blaming pedestrian). | Affirmed: court properly excluded expert legal conclusions about fault; such opinions were "too helpful" and invaded the jury’s province. |
| Probation eligibility / ineffective assistance | Court considered facts and discretion; denial of probation was within discretion and not based on presumed ineligibility. | Argues probation was denied based on incorrect presumption he was ineligible; counsel’s failure to contest that was ineffective assistance. | Affirmed: record shows court weighed discretion and did not rely on presumed ineligibility; no reversible error or prejudice shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Brown, 59 Cal.4th 86 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- People v. Roberts, 2 Cal.4th 271 (proximate cause and natural/probable consequence analysis)
- People v. Taylor, 119 Cal.App.4th 628 (causation inquiry in criminal cases)
- People v. Funes, 23 Cal.App.4th 1506 (dependent vs. independent intervening causes)
- Carlton v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 203 Cal.App.3d 1428 (expert testimony cannot state legal conclusions about responsibility)
- Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co., 69 Cal.App.4th 1155 (exclude expert opinions that are "too helpful" to the jury)
- People v. Coffman & Marlow, 34 Cal.4th 1 (jury competence to decide ultimate factual issues when underlying facts are admitted)
- People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (remand required if sentencing court misunderstood scope of its discretion)