People v. Inman
2014 IL App (5th) 120097
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- Inman was convicted in 1985 of murder and attempted murder; originally sentenced to natural life for murder and 30 years for attempted murder, to run concurrently.
- In 2000 he challenged the natural-life sentence under Apprendi; in 2001 the court vacated the natural-life sentence and ordered resentencing, with the State electing not to seek a jury finding for an extended term.
- At resentencing in 2006 the trial court, applying 1985 law, imposed 35 years for murder to run consecutively to the unchanged 30-year attempted-murder term; credit for time served was awarded.
- On direct appeal Inman did not raise the constitutional issues; that appeal was affirmed. He later filed a postconviction petition alleging (1) Pearce/due process violations and (2) double jeopardy from making the reduced murder term consecutive to the attempt term; the trial court dismissed at the second stage.
- The Fifth District affirmed: it held that neither the individual sentences nor the aggregate punishment exceeded the original exposure, and that running the reduced murder sentence consecutively did not violate Pearce, section 5-5-4, or the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether resentencing to a reduced murder term run consecutively to the existing attempt term violated Pearce/due process | State: Pearce permits increased sentence only for post-original conduct; here aggregate sentence was reduced and individual sentences not increased, so no Pearce violation | Inman: Making the reduced murder term consecutive transformed the concurrent 30-year attempt sentence into a more onerous punishment and violated Pearce and section 5-5-4 | Held: No Pearce/due process violation; neither individual sentence was made more severe and aggregate exposure decreased |
| Whether consecutive resentencing violated Double Jeopardy (multiple punishments/finality/credit) | State: Double jeopardy prevents punishment exceeding legislative authorization; each individual sentence is within statutory maximum and credits were awarded for time served | Inman: He had a legitimate expectation in the concurrent aspect of the original sentence and will lose some credit (day-for-day) because of consecutive calculation method, so double jeopardy was violated | Held: No double jeopardy violation; both individual and aggregate punishment reduced, credits awarded for time served satisfy protections and finality interest not frustrated here |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (constitutional rule on fact-finding for increased sentences)
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (due process limits on harsher resentencing; need objective reasons tied to post-sentencing conduct)
- Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (double jeopardy and reasonable expectations of finality in sentencing adjustments)
- People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (cannot increase individual sentences on resentencing even if aggregate unchanged)
- People v. Giller, 191 Ill. App. 3d 710 (aggregate-term approach: reduced individual terms running consecutively did not increase overall exposure)
- People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260 (sentence-credit rules for consecutive sentences; credit applied once toward aggregate)
- People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1 (consecutive sentencing affects service mechanics, not the sentence itself)