People v. Hutt, 220 N.E.3d 1088

On May 20, 2017, a crash occurred; police located a damaged vehicle registered to Oliver J. Hutt and found Hutt intoxicated on a nearby porch. He refused field‑sobriety and breath tests and refused blood/urine sampling at a hospital after officers obtained a search warrant.
Hutt was charged with obstructing justice (for refusing blood/urine under a warrant), DUI, leaving the scene, and traffic offenses; he was also facing a separate 2016 felony case that was tried first.
On October 10, 2017, Hutt signed a written jury‑waiver that listed two felony case numbers (the 2016 and obstructing‑justice felony). The waiver form did not list the DUI/traffic case numbers, but the court and counsel treated all five related cases together thereafter.
Hutt later proceeded to bench trial on the 2017 cases (including the DUI) without objecting at multiple hearings; he was convicted of obstructing justice, DUI, leaving the scene, and improper lane usage.
The appellate court affirmed both convictions, concluding Hutt had acquiesced in a jury waiver covering the DUI (invited error) and that his refusal to submit to testing constituted concealing physical evidence under the obstructing‑justice statute.
This Court affirmed the DUI conviction (finding a valid waiver by acquiescence) but reversed the obstructing‑justice conviction, holding a refusal to submit samples did not amount to concealing physical evidence under the statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hutt waived his constitutional right to a jury trial on the DUI count	The State: Hutt knowingly and voluntarily waived by his written waiver and his subsequent acquiescence in court proceedings; silence and counsel's statements suffice (per Frey).	Hutt: He never waived a jury trial in the DUI case; counsel misrepresented a waiver; silence did not equal an open‑court waiver (distinguishable from Frey; akin to Scott).	Held: Waiver valid by knowing acquiescence — no plain error; DUI conviction affirmed.
Whether refusing to provide blood/urine after issuance of a search warrant constitutes "conceal[ing]" physical evidence under 720 ILCS 5/31‑4(a)(1)	The State: Refusal prevented disclosure of physical evidence (and the information it would reveal), fitting the broader dictionary definition of "conceal."	Hutt: He took no action to hide or move blood/urine out of sight; mere refusal is not "concealment" of physical evidence.	Held: "Conceal" does not encompass mere refusal to submit to sampling; no concealment occurred — obstructing‑justice conviction reversed.

People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139 (Ill. 2011) (interpreting dual dictionary definitions of "conceal" in the obstructing‑justice statute)
People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327 (Ill. 1984) (silent acquiescence to bench trial on all counts can establish a valid jury‑waiver)
People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283 (Ill. 1999) (waiver executed outside open court cannot be presumed by later silence)
People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265 (Ill. 2004) (requirements for a knowing and understanding jury waiver)
People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52 (Ill. 2008) (preservation and plain‑error framework for unpreserved claims)