People v. Hunter
2017 IL 121306
| Ill. | 2018Background
- Two consolidated appeals: People v. Hunter and People v. Wilson, involving juveniles tried in adult court who were sentenced before January 1, 2016, and whose appeals were pending when new juvenile-related statutes took effect.
- Hunter (age 16 at offense) was convicted of aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery while armed with a firearm; sentenced to concurrent 21-year terms (6-year Class X minimum + 15-year firearm enhancement).
- Wilson (age 17 at offense) was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm; sentenced to 31 years (6-year minimum + 25-year firearm enhancement for personal discharge causing great bodily harm).
- While both cases were on direct review, Public Acts 99-69 and 99-258 (effective Jan. 1, 2016) amended: (1) the Juvenile Court Act (raised automatic transfer age and removed certain firearm offenses from automatic transfer list) and (2) the Unified Code of Corrections (added 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 permitting courts to decline mandatory firearm enhancements for offenders under 18).
- Defendants argued those amendments should apply retroactively to their pending appeals (Hunter seeking remand to juvenile court for transfer hearing and resentencing; Wilson seeking resentencing without the mandatory firearm enhancement).
- The appellate court rejected retroactive application; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed but clarified reasoning.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the amendment to 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (raising transfer age and removing certain firearm offenses from automatic transfer list) applies retroactively to Hunter, whose trial court proceedings were completed and whose appeal was pending | State: amendment applies only to "pending" trial court proceedings capable of conforming to the new rule; should not apply where proceedings are final or impracticable | Hunter: Howard requires retroactive application to all nonfinal cases pending on the statute's effective date, including appeals; he seeks remand to juvenile court for transfer hearing | The amendment does not apply to Hunter because his trial proceedings were concluded before the amendment and no further proceedings are required; remand is impracticable because Hunter aged out of juvenile court jurisdiction |
| Whether 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (discretion to decline firearm enhancement for offenders under 18) applies retroactively to defendants sentenced before Jan. 1, 2016 | Defendants: omission of temporal limitation from subsection (b) shows legislative intent that (b) applies retroactively to cases pending on direct review | State: the sentencing provision is a comprehensive scheme; temporal language in subsection (a) governs the whole; or, if silent, section 4 savings clause controls | Subsection (b) does not apply to defendants already sentenced before the statute's effective date; section 4 of the Statute on Statutes limits mitigation provisions to judgments pronounced after the law takes effect unless sentence is vacated and resentencing occurs (or defendant consents) |
| Whether subsection (b) is "mitigative" (thus governed by the second sentence of 5 ILCS 70/4) | Defendants: subsection (b) is non-mitigative or procedural and should apply retroactively | State: subsection (b) mitigates punishment because it authorizes declining otherwise mandatory enhancements (reducing potential sentence) | Subsection (b) mitigates punishment (it can reduce the low end of the sentencing range); therefore section 4 prevents its application to sentences already imposed prior to effective date unless resentencing occurs |
| Whether "pending cases" in Howard includes cases pending on direct review such that procedural amendments always apply | State: Howard's "pending cases" should be read narrowly to ongoing trial proceedings practicable to conform; not every appeal should trigger retroactive application | Hunter: Howard supports retroactive application to all nonfinal cases, including those on appeal | Court: "Pending cases" refers to ongoing proceedings capable of conforming to the new procedure; where trial proceedings are finished and no remand is required, retroactive application is not compelled; avoid absurd or impracticable results |
Key Cases Cited
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (establishes federal retroactivity framework for statutes and distinguishes procedural vs. substantive changes)
- People v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729 (Ill. 2016) (held amendment to juvenile transfer statute applied to pending trial-court proceedings under Illinois Statute on Statutes)
- People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499 (Ill. 2002) (section 4 savings clause: procedural changes apply retroactively, substantive do not)
- People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34 (Ill. 2011) (discusses application of new procedural statutes to ongoing proceedings)
- People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966 (Ill. 2017) (remand for adult-sentencing motion where sentencing error required resentencing; distinguishes cases where juvenile jurisdiction has expired)
- People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188 (Ill. 2007) (vacatur and remand for transfer hearing where transfer statute later declared void)