People v. Humphrey
2020 IL App (1st) 172837
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- In 1982 Fred Humphrey (age 21) and codefendants committed a violent home invasion: robbery, multiple shootings, rape, and one death; Humphrey admitted involvement and gave a written statement but later denied raping one victim at trial.
- Jury convicted Humphrey of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, home invasion, and rape; the circuit court imposed a natural-life sentence in December 1982 after finding no remorse and no prospect of rehabilitation.
- Humphrey had prior juvenile adjudications including armed robbery and a prior murder adjudication; he argued mitigating youth factors at sentencing without success.
- After direct appeal and an initial postconviction petition years earlier, Humphrey filed a successive postconviction petition (2017) arguing Miller-based and Illinois proportionate-penalties as-applied challenges because he was 21 at the time of the crimes and sought resentencing.
- The circuit court denied leave to file the successive petition, distinguishing Miller/House as applying to juveniles or younger ‘‘youthful offenders’’ and noting Humphrey’s active role (including rape) and discretionary life sentence; Humphrey appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Humphrey) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / Jurisdiction of appeal | Notice of appeal was timely filed (prison mailing; postmark) | State did not contest jurisdiction | Court found notice timely based on legible postmark and had jurisdiction |
| Leave to file successive petition under Post-Conviction Hearing Act (cause & prejudice) — Eighth Amendment / Miller-based as-applied challenge | Miller and progeny announced after his initial petition (cause); his natural-life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to his youth (prejudice) | Miller applies only to juveniles; Humphrey was 21 and not entitled to Miller relief | Denied leave: Humphrey failed to meet cause-and-prejudice because Miller-based protections do not extend to persons 21 or older under current law |
| As-applied challenge under Illinois proportionate-penalties clause | Harris/House permit as-applied challenges for young adults; his sentence is disproportionate given youth-related factors | His sentence was discretionary, court considered age/circumstances, he was an active participant with prior violent adjudications | Denied: Illinois precedent limits Miller extension to <21; Humphrey’s facts (age 21, active role, prior record, discretionary sentence) distinguish him from those granted relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; youth and attendant characteristics must be considered)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty for juvenile offenders unconstitutional)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional)
- People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932 (Ill.) (Illinois Supreme Court: rejected categorical Miller extension to ages 18–21; as-applied claims depend on developed record)
- People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B (Ill. App.) (appellate court held a 19-year-old’s mandatory life sentence unconstitutional as applied under Illinois proportionate-penalties clause)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Ill.) (life sentences for juvenile defendants violate the Eighth Amendment unless court considers youth and attendant characteristics)
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (Ill.) (40+ year sentence can constitute a de facto life sentence under Miller principles)
- People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150 (Ill.) (successive postconviction petition requires sufficient documentation to allow cause-and-prejudice determination)