People v. Howard, 89 N.E.3d 308

On Nov. 8, 2012, defendant Archie Howard (a registered child sex offender) was observed by police sitting in his parked car about 15 feet from Irving Elementary School while 80–100 children were on the school grounds.
Officer Lenover ran the plate, confirmed Howard’s status, approached the car, and arrested Howard for knowingly loitering within 500 feet of a school while persons under 18 were present.
At trial Howard testified he had driven a friend to deliver lunches to her grandchildren, waited in the car (balancing his checkbook and paying bills) for 4–5 minutes, and denied admitting he knew he shouldn’t be near the school. The friend corroborated the short delivery trip.
The trial court found Howard violated 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(b) and rejected his claimed legitimate purpose, sentencing him to 30 months’ probation.
The appellate court affirmed (one justice dissenting). The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave and affirmed the appellate court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the evidence proved "loitering" under 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(d)(11)(i)	The State: loitering includes "standing, sitting idly, whether or not the person is in a vehicle, or remaining" near school; Howard knowingly remained in his parked car within 500 feet while children were present.	Howard: the vehicle-specific phrase applies only to "sitting idly," so his short, purposeful wait (dropping off lunches) was not "sitting idly" and thus not loitering.	Court: statutory language is plain — "remaining" independently covers staying in a vehicle; evidence (parking and waiting 4–5 minutes with children present) sufficed to prove loitering.
Whether § 11-9.3(b) is unconstitutionally vague as applied	The State: statute clearly not vague when applied to someone who parks and waits near a school while children are present.	Howard: "remain" lacks a temporal limit and so fails to give ordinary persons notice or provide objective standards for enforcement; Morales suggests requirement of harmful purpose or overt act.	Court: statute constitutional as applied; ordinary people can distinguish transitory presence from remaining (e.g., parking and waiting); Morales is distinguishable and does not invalidate a statute that prohibits remaining per se.

People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427 (Illinois 2005) (plain-meaning statutory construction principles)
In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181 (Illinois 2001) (use of "or" is disjunctive; statutory terms may operate independently)
People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563 (Illinois 2016) (statute presumed constitutional; party challenging must clearly show invalidity)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (due-process vagueness standard for criminal statutes)
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1999) (plurality) (ordinance defining loitering as remaining "with no apparent purpose" held unconstitutionally vague)