60 Cal.App.5th 94
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- In 1988 Hernandez and an accomplice, Bobby Steele, burglarized an electronics store; Steele shot and killed LAPD Officer James Beyea; Steele was later killed and Hernandez (unarmed) was captured hiding nearby.
- Hernandez was tried solely on a first degree felony-murder theory, convicted of murder and burglary, and originally sentenced to 25-to-life; this court later corrected the judgment to second degree murder and resentenced him to 15-to-life.
- In 2019 the Legislature enacted SB 1437 (amending Penal Code §§ 188, 189) narrowing felony-murder liability and creating Penal Code § 1170.95 to allow petitions to vacate murder convictions that would not stand under the amended law.
- Hernandez petitioned under § 1170.95; the prosecutor argued § 189(f) (peace officer exception) permits felony-murder convictions without proving malice if the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was a peace officer.
- The superior court denied the petition, finding Hernandez knew (or should have known) the victim was an officer while still fleeing (i.e., before reaching temporary safety) and that § 189(f) excuses the malice requirement; Hernandez appealed.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: (1) § 189(f) is properly read as an exception that permits felony-murder liability without proving malice when the victim is a peace officer and the defendant had the requisite knowledge; (2) law-of-the-case and double jeopardy arguments did not bar application of current law; (3) substantial evidence supports the court’s finding Hernandez knew the victim was an officer before reaching safety.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Hernandez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 189(f) requires proof of malice under § 188(a)(3) | § 189(f) is an exception allowing felony-murder convictions of participants without proving malice when victim is a peace officer and defendant knew or should have known it | § 189(f) merely says subdivision (e) "does not apply," so § 188(a)(3)’s malice requirement remains and prosecution must prove malice | Held: § 189(f) is an exception to the malice requirement; prosecution need not prove malice when § 189(f) conditions are met |
| Whether Hernandez is ineligible for § 1170.95 relief because prior appellate decision fixed his conviction as second degree (law of the case) | Current statutory scheme controls eligibility; inquiry is whether petitioner could be convicted under current law | Hernandez: this court’s 1990 decision (reducing to second degree) is law of the case and precludes treating him as liable for first degree now | Held: Law-of-the-case does not bar considering current law; intervening controlling decisions (e.g., Mendoza) and § 1170.95’s "what would happen today" framework control |
| Whether Hernandez had requisite knowledge under § 189(f) before reaching a place of temporary safety | The People: evidence shows Hernandez saw officers chase Steele and was still fleeing when he learned victim was an officer | Hernandez: He did not know (and could not reasonably know) the victim was an officer until after the burglary ended | Held: Substantial evidence supports that Hernandez knew or should have known the victim was an officer while still in flight (before reaching temporary safety) |
| Whether applying § 1170.95 and current law raises double jeopardy concerns | People: § 1170.95 is a resentencing/eligibility procedure, not a new prosecution; double jeopardy not implicated | Hernandez: Converting back to first degree now violates double jeopardy | Held: No double jeopardy violation; § 1170.95 is retroactive ameliorative relief and does not bar the court from assessing eligibility under current law |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351 (explaining § 1157 effect when jury fails to specify degree)
- People v. Mendoza, 23 Cal.4th 896 (overruling McDonald in felony-murder-only prosecutions)
- People v. Cavitt, 33 Cal.4th 187 (continuous-transaction doctrine for felony murder)
- People v. Wilkins, 56 Cal.4th 333 (scope of felony-murder liability and related doctrines)
- People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal.3d 730 (recognizing aggravated nature of killing peace officers)
- People v. Gentile, 10 Cal.5th 830 (interpreting SB 1437 mens rea and § 1170.95 framework)