People v. Hernandez, 2016 IL 118672

In 1999 Hernandez was tried for home invasion, armed robbery, and armed violence for a 1998 incident in which he entered the Pakostas’ home, struck them with a metal tool (tin snips), and stole money/jewelry.
The State charged armed robbery counts alleging defendant was armed with "a bludgeon"; the specific tin snips were never recovered but witnesses described heavy metal shears/tin snips used to strike victims.
After trial and appeals, Hernandez received an extended 40-year Class X sentence for armed robbery (on remand); he filed a postconviction petition contending this sentence violated the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause because it equaled or exceeded penalties for an offense with allegedly identical elements (armed violence with a Category III weapon).
The trial court granted relief, holding the armed robbery sentencing scheme facially unconstitutional because it produced a harsher penalty than armed violence with a Category III weapon (bludgeon), and ordered a new sentencing hearing.
The State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court; the Supreme Court reviewed whether the elements of armed robbery (armed with a "dangerous weapon" under common law) are identical to those of armed violence (armed with a statutory Category III weapon like a "bludgeon").

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Hernandez)	Held
Whether the Class X extended sentence for armed robbery violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause because its elements are identical to armed violence with a Category III weapon	The statutes are not identical: "dangerous weapon" in armed robbery (common-law definition) is broader than the statutorily defined Category III list for armed violence	The State previously characterized the weapon as a "bludgeon" at trial; therefore the State is judicially estopped from arguing the weapon does not meet the armed violence Category III definition	Court held elements are not identical; no proportionate-penalties violation; reinstated 40-year sentence
Whether the State is judicially estopped from litigating the legal-elements issue because it earlier described the weapon as a "bludgeon" at trial	The State may change legal positions; its trial position was factual (weapon used as a bludgeon), while the postconviction claim raises a legal-elements question	Hernandez argued the State benefitted from the bludgeon designation and cannot now argue otherwise	Court held judicial estoppel inapplicable because the earlier trial position was factual and the later contention is a legal question

People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130 (statutory armed-violence Category III list does not encompass pellet/BB guns; ejusdem generis limits "of like character")
People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255 (definition of "dangerous weapon" for armed robbery includes objects used in a manner likely to cause serious injury)
People v. Skelton, 83 Ill. 2d 58 (what constitutes a dangerous weapon is a question of fact; common-law definition includes objects susceptible to dangerous use)
People v. Vue, 353 Ill. App. 3d 774 (flashlight used to strike victim was not a Category III weapon under armed-violence statute though it could be used as a bludgeon)
People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172 (identical-penalties expectation supports proportionate-penalties analysis)