83 Cal.App.5th 608
Cal. Ct. App.2022Background
- Defendant Frank Eli Heard committed drive-by attempted murders at age 15 and, shortly after turning 16, committed a homicide for which he pled to voluntary manslaughter; he was sentenced to a total term of 23 years plus 80 years to life (aggregate a de facto life-without-parole exposure at sentencing).
- Fifteen years into incarceration, Heard petitioned under Penal Code § 1170, former subd. (d)(2) (now subd. (d)(1)) to recall and resentencing, arguing his aggregate term was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP).
- The trial court denied the petition as statutorily ineligible because Heard had not been sentenced to an explicitly designated LWOP term.
- On appeal Heard raised two issues: (1) whether § 1170(d)(1)(A) covers juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP, and (2) whether refusing relief to those juveniles violates equal protection.
- The Court of Appeal held § 1170(d)(1)(A) is textually limited to defendants sentenced to an explicitly designated LWOP term, but concluded that excluding juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP from § 1170(d)(1) violates equal protection because similarly situated juveniles are treated without a rational basis.
- The court reversed the denial of Heard’s petition and remanded for the trial court to consider the merits of resentencing under § 1170(d)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of § 1170(d)(1)(A) — whether it covers juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP | Heard: statute should apply to juveniles sentenced to aggregate terms that are the functional equivalent of LWOP | People/Trial court: statutory text requires an explicitly designated LWOP sentence | Court: rejects Heard’s interpretive argument; § 1170(d)(1)(A) is limited to explicitly designated LWOP sentences |
| Equal protection — whether excluding juveniles with functional-equivalent LWOP from § 1170(d)(1) is constitutional | Heard: exclusion denies similarly situated juveniles an equal opportunity for resentencing and lacks a rational basis | People: distinctions are permissible; legislative focus was LWOP and remedy is rational; also urged forfeiture | Court: appellate forfeiture rule excused; differential treatment fails rational-basis review and violates equal protection; reversal and remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (bar on death penalty for offenders under 18)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (Eighth Amendment bars LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders; requires realistic opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencing discretion and youth-related mitigation required)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (U.S. 2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule with retroactive application; states may provide parole hearings as a remedy)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (Cal. 2012) (aggregate term-of-years that places parole eligibility beyond natural life is a functional equivalent of LWOP)
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (Sen. Bill 260 §3051 youth‑offender parole hearings can moot Miller claims where they provide meaningful opportunity for release)
- In re Kirchner, 2 Cal.5th 1040 (Cal. 2017) (§1170(d) resentencing procedure inadequate by itself to cure Miller error)
- People v. Contreras, 4 Cal.5th 349 (Cal. 2018) (recognizing functional-equivalent LWOP holdings in juvenile sentencing context)