People v. Harris, 2020 IL App (3d) 160169

Louis C. Harris was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school (alleged 1.06 grams cocaine); he had an extensive felony history.
Harris repeatedly insisted on proceeding pro se; the court repeatedly admonished him but appointed standby counsel (Elwin Neal) then allowed Neal to withdraw after conflicts.
Harris asked the court to appoint replacement standby counsel; the court denied the request, citing that its initial reason to appoint (concerns about Harris’s literacy) was mistaken.
Trial proceeded with Harris representing himself; evidence included a confidential informant and the apartment occupant (Curran) who was present during the transaction; jury convicted after about a day.
On appeal Harris raised four principal claims: denial of new standby counsel, failure to give an accomplice-witness instruction (IPI Crim. No. 3.17), refusal to allow juror note-taking (statutory right), and alleged failure to conduct a proper preliminary Krankel inquiry into a pro se ineffective-assistance claim.
The appellate majority affirmed: no abuse of discretion in denying new standby counsel, accomplice-instruction and note-taking errors were forfeited / not subject to second-prong plain-error relief, and the court’s Krankel inquiry was adequate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Harris)	Held
Denial of replacement standby counsel	Forfeited; even on review, trial court acted within discretion (Gibson factors not met).	Court abused discretion: Gibson factors favored standby counsel; denial prejudiced trial.	Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; no plain-error relief.
Failure to give accomplice-witness instruction (IPI Crim. No. 3.17)	Forfeited; court was not required to sua sponte give the instruction; not second-prong plain error.	Instruction was required because Curran implicated Harris; omission deprived jury of guidance on weighing accomplice testimony.	Forfeited; assuming error, not reversible under second-prong plain-error standard.
Juror note-taking prohibition	Forfeited; if reviewed, any error was harmless given overwhelming evidence.	Statutory right to note-taking violated and prejudiced Harris by impairing juror fact-tracking.	Court erred in prohibiting notes (statute), but claim forfeited and not second-prong plain error; evidence overwhelming so harmless.
Krankel preliminary inquiry into pro se ineffective-assistance claim	Trial court adequately inquired, elicited defendant’s concerns, and reasonably found the claim meritless.	Trial court failed to conduct proper Krankel inquiry and ignored defendant’s posttrial complaints about counsel.	Affirmed — court conducted sufficient inquiry; remand for further Krankel inquiry unnecessary.

People v. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d 362 (1990) (trial court may appoint standby counsel; court should consider charge gravity, complexity, and defendant’s abilities).
People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536 (2001) (self-representation does not guarantee right to legal assistance; role of standby counsel explained).
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984) (trial court must inquire into pro se posttrial ineffective-assistance claims).
People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68 (2003) (methods and sufficiency of Krankel inquiry described).
People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113 (2009) (plain-error doctrine primer; burden on defendant).
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005) (forfeiture of instructional error absent timely objection/posttrial motion).
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (2007) (plain-error standards).
People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1 (2004) (omission of instruction is second-prong plain error only when it seriously threatens trial fairness).
People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32 (2009) (distinguishing typical trial errors from breakdowns in the adversary process).