People v. Harper, 2017 IL App (4th) 150045

Background

Defendant Lafayette Harper was tried for first-degree murder for the October 24, 2009 killing of Timothy Shutes; a six-person jury convicted him and he received a 65-year sentence.
Key trial evidence: eyewitness Randall Smalley eventually identified Harper as the shooter; fingerprints from the rear passenger door of the vehicle were matched to Harper; phone records showed multiple calls between a phone given to police by co‑defendant Davieon Harper and a number registered to Lafayette Harper; DNA on a backpack did not exclude Harper.
Police recovered a cell phone from Davieon and obtained Verizon records for the number registered to Lafayette; the State admitted the phone records over defense objection.
The trial court initially told the parties the jury would not see the content of text messages in the phone records, but later permitted the full records (including text-content) to go to the jury.
One exchanged text (about three hours after the murder) shown to the jury contained incoming messages to Harper alleging "I heard you had something to do with a white boy getting killed today," which the court later deemed inadmissible hearsay on appeal.

Issues

Issue	People’s Argument	Harper’s Argument	Held
Validity of 6‑person jury waiver	No special admonition required; waiver may be found from the record	Waiver was not knowing/intelligent because not in writing and court only referenced a "customary twelve" panel	Waiver was valid: defendant and counsel requested 6‑person jury, court questioned defendant, no error
Destruction of vehicle (due process)	Vehicle was not used at trial; preserved fingerprint evidence was available; no bad faith	State violated due process by disposing vehicle after discovery request; Newberry outcome‑determinative standard applies	No violation: defendant forfeited bad‑faith claim, vehicle not central, preserved evidence available; Newberry inapplicable
Admission of coconspirator statements (Davieon)	Presented independent circumstantial evidence (fingerprints, phone contacts, Smalley’s testimony) to make prima facie showing of conspiracy	No proof of meeting of minds or sufficient independent evidence to link Harper to Davieon’s statements	No error: the State proved a prima facie conspiracy by independent circumstantial evidence, so coconspirator statements were admissible
Admission of text‑message content from phone registered to Harper	Call/text logs are business records; phone number tied to Harper so records admissible in full	Text content contained multiple hearsay, lacked source authentication, and State had previously indicated it would not introduce message content; admission was highly prejudicial	Reversed: admitting the content (unidentified incoming messages alleging Harper killed a "white boy") was erroneous and highly prejudicial; conviction vacated and remanded for new trial

Key Cases Cited

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (federal bad‑faith standard for destroyed evidence)
People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310 (Illinois 1995) (disposition of evidence that is outcome‑determinative after defense requests preservation violates due process)
People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187 (Illinois 2006) (distinguishing Newberry where destroyed evidence was not central and preserved materials were available)
People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52 (Illinois 2008) (no fixed formula for jury waiver; depends on facts and circumstances)
People v. Matthews, 304 Ill. App. 3d 415 (Illinois App. Ct.) (presumed prejudice where record silent about defendant's awareness of 12‑person jury right)
People v. Duckworth, 180 Ill. App. 3d 792 (Illinois App. Ct.) (independent, substantial evidence required to admit coconspirator statements)
People v. Roppo, 234 Ill. App. 3d 116 (Illinois App. Ct.) (State must make prima facie showing of conspiracy before coconspirator statements admitted)
People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322 (Illinois 2008) (sufficiency of evidence standard and double jeopardy discussion)