People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453

Defendant Antoine Hardman was convicted after a bench trial of possessing 1–15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school (Class X felony). The charged school was identified as Ryerson Elementary (later called Laura Ward).
At trial two Chicago police officers (Harmon and Ruggiero) testified they were long-term 11th District officers familiar with the neighborhood and identified 646 N. Lawndale (Laura Ward/Ryerson) as the nearby school; a county investigator measured ~88 feet from the offense location to the school parking lot.
The State’s pretrial motion to amend the information to reflect the school’s later name change was denied; the prosecution proceeded relying on testimony that the building was a school.
At sentencing the court imposed a $500 public‑defender reimbursement fee after a brief exchange (court asked defense counsel how many times she had appeared), but did not elicit a financial affidavit or question the defendant about ability to pay.
The appellate court affirmed the conviction, vacated the fee, and remanded for a proper hearing on ability to pay; the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, affirmed the conviction, and remanded for a proper fee hearing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State was required to prove the building was an "active/operational" school on the date of the offense to trigger the 1,000‑foot enhancement	State: statute does not add an "active/operation" element; definition of school is supplied by Criminal Code and §407(c) makes time-of-day/year irrelevant	Hardman: must prove particularized, personal‑knowledge evidence that the building was functioning as a school that day; mere officer identification is insufficient	Held: No. §407(b)(1) does not require proof school was active on the offense date; officers’ familiar‑area testimony sufficed to infer the building was a school and the enhancement was proved.
Whether the $500 public defender reimbursement fee must be vacated outright because no proper ability‑to‑pay hearing occurred within 90 days	Hardman: no adequate hearing occurred (court never inquired into his finances or took affidavit), so fee should be vacated without remand	State: a hearing occurred within 90 days; remedy is remand for a proper hearing	Held: Trial court failed to comply with §113‑3.1(a) requirements, but "some sort of a hearing" occurred within 90 days; vacatur of the fee was appropriate on appeal and the proper remedy is remand for a compliant hearing.

People v. Young, 2011 IL 111886 (statutory scope of "school" and reliance on Criminal Code definition)
People v. Somers, 2013 IL 114054 (what constitutes a sufficient hearing under §113‑3.1(a))
People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590 (public defender fee imposed improperly by clerk; limits on remand when no court order sought)
People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255 (constitutional limits on rebuttable presumptions and evidentiary burdens)
People v. Cook, 81 Ill. 2d 176 (due process requires notice and hearing before ordering reimbursement)
People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550 (legislative remedy creating §113‑3.1 to address Cook defects)
People v. Morgan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1026 (proof required to establish a location was a public park)