People v. Hardman
104 N.E.3d 372
| Ill. | 2017Background
- Defendant Antoine Hardman was convicted after a bench trial of possession with intent to deliver 1–15 grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school (Class X felony). The alleged school building was 646 N. Lawndale Ave (identified as Ryerson Elementary, later Laura Ward).
- Police officers who worked for years in the 11th District testified they were familiar with the area, identified the building as Ryerson (later Laura Ward), and an investigator measured about 88 feet from the offense location to the school’s parking lot.
- At sentencing the court imposed an eight-year prison term and, after the State reminded the court of its motion for public defender reimbursement, the court ordered a $500 public defender fee after asking defense counsel how many times she appeared in the case.
- Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the State failed to prove the building functioned as a school on the date of the offense and (2) the $500 public defender fee was imposed without a proper hearing on ability to pay; the appellate court affirmed the conviction, vacated the fee, and remanded for a new hearing.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the State must prove a school was active/operational on the offense date and whether the fee should be vacated or remanded for a proper hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Hardman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State must prove a school was active/operational on the date of the offense for the 1,000-foot enhancement | The statute does not require proof of operational/active status; the statutory definition and §407(c) make time-of-day/class-session irrelevant | The State must present particularized evidence that the building was an active/operational school on the date of the offense (witnesses with personal knowledge) | The court held the State need not prove a school was active/operational on the date; proof that the property is a school (and officer familiarity) suffices under §407(b)(1) and §407(c) |
| Whether the $500 public defender reimbursement fee must be vacated outright because no proper hearing on ability to pay occurred | The State conceded the hearing was deficient but argued a hearing occurred and remand for a proper hearing is the appropriate remedy when some hearing occurred within the 90-day period | Hardman argued no hearing occurred within §113-3.1(a)’s 90-day period and the fee must be vacated without remand | The court held the imposition did not comply with §113-3.1(a) but because “some sort of a hearing” occurred within the statutory period, remand for a proper hearing was the appropriate remedy (fee vacated pending that hearing) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Young, 2011 IL 111886 (interpreting the term “school” in the enhancing statute)
- People v. Somers, 2013 IL 114054 (defining requirements for a proper public defender fee hearing and endorsing remand when an insufficient hearing occurred within the time limit)
- People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590 (fee imposed by clerk without court authority must be vacated; distinguishes situations where circuit court or State sought fee)
- People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255 (discusses limits on rebuttable presumptions in criminal statutes)
- People v. Cook, 81 Ill. 2d 176 (procedural due process requires a hearing before ordering reimbursement)
- People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550 (legislative amendment requiring hearing to remedy Cook due-process defect)