2016 COA 175
Colo. Ct. App.2016Background
- William Hardin was convicted (1988 trial) of multiple aggravated robberies and felony murders; convictions and sentences (including life terms) were later adjusted on remand.
- Hardin filed a Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and other claims; the proceedings were subject to extreme delay (roughly 12 years between filings and active processing).
- Multiple appointed counsel repeatedly failed to act; two earlier postconviction judges and counsel inactivity contributed to prolonged inaction until a final judge pushed the case forward in 2012.
- After evidentiary hearings, the postconviction court denied relief, finding the delay, although lengthy, did not cause legal prejudice and that Hardin failed to satisfy Strickland prejudice for his ineffective-assistance claims.
- Hardin appealed, arguing (1) the prolonged postconviction delay violated due process and warranted a new trial, and (2) trial counsel ineffectiveness (including obstructing Hardin’s right to testify and failing to object to duplicity/trifurcation) merited relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due-process challenge to 12-year postconviction delay | Government: delay did not cause legal prejudice; remedy to promptly adjudicate claims was sufficient | Hardin: delay impaired his ability to present claims (faded memories, missing records); should get new trial | Court applied Barker balancing, found delay presumptively prejudicial but no sufficient prejudice; remedy to resolve motion was proper (no new trial) |
| Standard to evaluate delay in postconviction proceedings | N/A (court adoption) | Hardin urged application analogous to appellate-delay framework | Court held Barker v. Wingo balancing factors apply to postconviction delay claims (first impression for Colorado) |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to object to duplicity/trifurcation of robbery count | Hardin: counsel’s failure was deficient and prejudiced outcome; could have prevented convictions or preserved direct appeal issue | People: record and trial-court power to amend/variance made the claim speculative; postconviction court found no prejudice | Court deferred to factual findings; concluded Hardin failed Strickland prejudice prong and denied relief |
| Waiver of right to testify | Hardin: waiver was not knowing/voluntary; counsel interfered after he initially wanted to testify | People: trial court gave proper advisals; later incorporation of prior advisal was sufficient; waiver was valid | Court found Curtis advisal was given and second advisal incorporated it; waiver was knowing, voluntary, intelligent; claim denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (sets four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial/delay analyses)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes performance and prejudice standards for ineffective assistance)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (2009) (delay caused by defendant’s counsel is ordinarily charged to defendant)
- Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2007) (standards for Crim. P. 35(c) review and deference to postconviction findings)
- People v. Valdez, 178 P.3d 1269 (Colo. App. 2007) (postconviction-delay relief: remedy can be adjudication rather than new trial absent prejudice)
- People v. Glaser, 250 P.3d 632 (Colo. App. 2010) (mixed question of fact and law review; use of delay factors in non-trial contexts)