People v. Handy
2019 IL App (1st) 170213
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- In Feb. 1997, Handy (age 18½) and three codefendants invaded a home, robbed the family at gunpoint, kidnapped and repeatedly sexually assaulted a 15-year-old; Handy held a gun to the father, helped drive the van, and participated in the sexual assaults.
- Convicted in 1998 of multiple felonies; trial court imposed four consecutive 30-year terms (120 years). After a statutory change, his effective real‑time exposure was converted to 60 years (eligible for mandatory supervised release at ~78½).
- Direct appeal and earlier postconviction petitions were denied; prior appeals affirmed the sentence and its discretionary imposition.
- In 2016 Handy sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing his 60‑year term is a de facto life sentence and that Miller/Graham principles (and their retroactivity under Montgomery) require resentencing or relief under the Eighth Amendment and Illinois proportionate penalties clause.
- The circuit court denied leave to file; the appellate court reviewed whether Handy satisfied the Act’s cause‑and‑prejudice standard to permit a successive petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Handy showed cause and prejudice under 725 ILCS 5/122‑1(f) to file a successive postconviction petition based on Miller/Graham/Montgomery | People: No — Miller protections apply only to juvenile offenders; Handy was an adult at 18½ so he cannot show the required prejudice | Handy: Miller (and Graham) principles and Montgomery’s retroactivity create cause; his 60‑year term is de facto life for a young offender and thus unconstitutional as applied | Denied. Court held Handy did not show prejudice; Miller/Graham protections do not extend to someone who was an adult at the time of the offense; leave to file successive petition not warranted |
| Whether Illinois’ proportionate penalties clause requires extending Miller principles to barely‑adult offenders (i.e., treat 18‑21 similarly to juveniles) | People: No extension required; sentencing was discretionary and the court considered mitigation; Handy was an active, violent participant | Handy: State clause should allow Miller‑style consideration for young adults close to 18; his youth/rehabilitative potential were not adequately weighed | Denied. Court declined to extend Miller under the state clause here — distinguishing House where a young adult acted only as a lookout; Handy was an active participant and received a discretionary sentence in which mitigation was considered |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juveniles are constitutionally different; mandatory life without parole for children requires individualized youth‑focused sentencing)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorical ban on life without parole for juveniles in nonhomicide cases)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced substantive rule made retroactive)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barred capital punishment for offenders under 18)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Ill. 2017) (Miller applies to discretionary life sentences; courts must consider youth‑related factors)
- People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932 (Ill. 2018) (Miller does not automatically apply to adults; juvenile‑maturity science must be developed in the record)
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (Ill. 2019) (for juvenile offenders, de facto life defined as sentences over 40 years)
- People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (extended Miller principles under proportionate penalties clause to a 19‑year‑old who was merely a lookout and faced a mandatory natural life sentence)