People v. Hallak
310 Mich. App. 555
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Defendant Hallak, a physician, was convicted of CSC II, CSC III, and six CSC IV counts involving multiple victims; CSC II is based on touching SB, a 12-year-old patient, during an exam on March 30, 2010.
- SB testified Hallak cupped her right breast for 1–30 seconds while allegedly checking her breathing; MB witnessed the event and questioned Hallak.
- Expert testimony indicated touching a patient’s breast during a throat exam is unethical and not medically warranted; defense witnesses argued the examination context could involve routine touching.
- Defendant argued the evidence showed only incidental touching tied to a medical exam and lacked evidence of sexual intent; the jury rejected this view.
- Sentencing included prison terms and lifetime electronic monitoring mandated for CSC II against a minor; the court rejected challenges to the monitoring as unconstitutional or violative of double jeopardy, and addressed sentencing-guidelines scoring.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of CSC II evidence | Hallak’s touch was for a sexual purpose; SB’s testimony, MB’s observations, and expert ethics testimony support intent. | Touching during a medical exam can occur legitimately; no explicit sexual purpose shown. | Sufficient evidence supported CSC II based on sexual purpose inferred from conduct and context. |
| Cruel/unusual punishment of lifetime electronic monitoring | Lifetime monitoring is a valid, non-disproportionate punishment for CSC II involving a minor. | Monitoring is cruel/unusual punishment, and potentially unconstitutional. | Lifetime electronic monitoring is not cruel or unusual under state or federal constitutions as applied to this defendant. |
| Fourth Amendment challenge to electronic monitoring | Monitoring is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. | Monitoring intrudes on privacy in a way that may be unreasonable. | Placement of monitoring is a search, but the intrusion is reasonable given public safety interests and recidivism concerns. |
| Double jeopardy | Legislature can impose both imprisonment and lifetime monitoring for the same offense. | Monetary cost and enhanced punishment could violate double jeopardy. | No double jeopardy violation; sequential sanctions (prison plus lifetime monitoring) were constitutionally permissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625 (Mich. 1998) (un corroborated CSC victim testimony permissible for conviction)
- People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594 (Mich. App. 2008) (circumstantial evidence supports defendant's state of mind)
- People v Cole, 491 Mich 325 (Mich. 2012) (lifetime electronic monitoring deemed punishment under CSC statutes)
- Grady v North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (U.S. 2015) (Fourth Amendment search when offender wears monitoring device; balancing test for reasonableness)
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (U.S. 2012) (physical intrusion on property constitutes a search)
- People v Herron, 303 Mich App 392 (Mich. App. 2013) (Herron controls whether Alleyne-type reasoning applies to guideline scoring)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (proportionality in as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge)
- Solem v Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1983) (extreme sentences and proportionality framework)
- Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998 (6th Cir. 2007) (recidivism and monitoring as a correctional tool)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (U.S. 2006) (state interests in reducing recidivism justify privacy intrusions)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (relevance of recidivism risk to punishment)
- Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (U.S. 1985) (reasonableness balancing in searches)