People v. Guillermo
2016 IL App (1st) 151799
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Mario Guillermo was arrested for DUI on Jan 3, 2015 and served a notice of statutory summary suspension for refusal/failure to complete chemical testing.
- The notice warned suspension would take effect on the 46th day after service and that Guillermo could file a petition to rescind within 90 days; he filed that petition on Jan 15, 2015.
- The hearing was continued by agreement (defendant and State) from Feb 6 to Feb 13; the contested hearing ultimately occurred on Feb 18, 2015.
- At the Feb 18 hearing the Secretary of State had not yet filed a confirmation of suspension with the court; after denial of the petition, the Secretary of State filed a confirmation showing an effective date of Feb 18, 2015.
- Guillermo argued (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction without the Secretary of State confirmation, (2) the matter was not ripe for adjudication without confirmation, and (3) the hearing was untimely because it occurred more than 30 days after he filed his petition.
- The circuit court denied the petition to rescind and denied reconsideration; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a petition to rescind under 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) | The court has jurisdiction to hear rescission petitions filed under section 2-118.1(b) | No jurisdiction absent Secretary of State confirmation; without confirmation there is nothing to rescind | Court had subject-matter jurisdiction; petition alleged a justiciable matter and invoked court’s power to entertain rescission requests |
| Ripeness of petition to rescind when Secretary of State has not yet confirmed suspension under 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(h) | Petition was ripe because the statutory summary suspension self-executes on day 46 and harm was imminent | Not ripe: without Secretary of State confirmation there was no suspension to rescind | Petition was ripe; confirmation is ministerial and not a prerequisite to court relief |
| Whether a secretary-of-state confirmation is required before a court may rescind a suspension | Confirmation merely attests to effective date; suspension self-executes by statute | A suspension cannot be rescinded until confirmed by Secretary of State | Confirmation is not required; the suspension is self-executing and confirmation is ministerial |
| Timeliness of the hearing required by section 2-118.1(b) (30-day rule) | Hearing must occur within 30 days of filing unless delay is occasioned by defendant | Hearing was untimely because held 33 days after filing (Jan 15 to Feb 18) | Defendant agreed to a continuance that tolled the 30-day period; hearing fell within the extended 30-day window, so denial was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491 (1988) (explains 2-118.1(b) hearing may be pre- or post-suspension because suspension is self-executing)
- People v. Bywater, 223 Ill. 2d 477 (2006) (30-day hearing period runs from filing; courts must enforce statutory timing)
- People v. Eidel, 319 Ill. App. 3d 496 (2001) (section 11-501.1(g) is self-executing)
- People v. Madden, 273 Ill. App. 3d 114 (1995) (delay attributable to State can require rescission where hearing untimely)
- People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250 (1992) (continuance by defendant occasions delay that tolls time periods)