People v. Gordon
145 N.E.3d 460
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Defendant Richard L. Gordon was stopped for an unreadable license plate; during the stop he gave the name "Brian Lynn Watson" and a false birthdate to Deputy Fritcher.
- Officer ran the name twice (after having the defendant write it down); no record was found. The officer then conducted a pat-down, recovered a wallet with an ID showing the defendant’s real name (Richard Gordon), and discovered an outstanding warrant and revoked license.
- The stop was recorded on the deputy’s body camera; contraband was later found in the vehicle after a K‑9 alert.
- Gordon was charged with felony obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31‑4(a)(1)) for furnishing false information with intent to prevent apprehension; he moved to dismiss, arguing the offense should have been misdemeanor obstructing identification (720 ILCS 5/31‑4.5), but the motion was denied.
- A jury convicted Gordon of obstructing justice; he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and a cost sheet later included a $100 public‑defender reimbursement fee.
- Gordon appealed, raising four issues: sufficiency/material‑impediment requirement, reduction to obstructing identification, excessive sentence, and vacatur of the public‑defender fee for lack of the statutorily required hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency / material‑impediment requirement for obstructing justice by furnishing false info | State: furnishing false info with intent to prevent apprehension satisfies 31‑4(a)(1); no separate material‑impediment requirement for false‑information theory | Gordon: false information only caused a minimal delay; officer identified and arrested him within minutes, so evidence insufficient | Affirmed. Court held no material‑impediment requirement for obstructing justice when charged on furnishing false information; evidence was sufficient. |
| Reduction to obstructing identification (misdemeanor) | State: prosecutor has discretion to charge felony where elements differ (intent required for obstructing justice) | Gordon: specific misdemeanor statute (31‑4.5) should control; charging felony negates misdemeanor statute and rule of lenity applies | Rejected. Court upheld charging discretion and affirmed felony conviction because elements differ (intent element). |
| Excessive sentence (30 months) | State: sentence noted; defendant already served term | Gordon: sentence excessive | Moot. Defendant served the sentence; appellate court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief. |
| Public‑defender reimbursement fee (725 ILCS 5/113‑3.1(a)) | State: costs were discussed at sentencing; court could remand for a proper hearing | Gordon: no hearing occurred to consider financial affidavit as required; fee must be vacated | Fee vacated. Court found no statutory hearing or consideration of defendant's finances occurred and vacated the $100 reimbursement fee. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139 (Sup. Ct. Ill.) (brief concealment that does not materially impede investigation does not satisfy concealing‑evidence theory of obstructing justice)
- People v. Davis, 409 Ill. App. 3d 457 (Ill. App. Ct.) (distinguishes concealing‑evidence cases; furnishing false information can complete the offense immediately and need not cause material delay)
- People v. Gordon, 64 Ill. 2d 166 (Sup. Ct. Ill.) (prosecutor has discretion to charge under the statute providing greater penalty when conduct violates multiple statutes)
- People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196 (Sup. Ct. Ill.) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- People v. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d 267 (Sup. Ct. Ill.) (mootness doctrine and when appellate courts lack jurisdiction)
- People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453 (Sup. Ct. Ill.) (what may qualify as "some sort of a hearing" for public‑defender fee reimbursement issues)