People v. Gonzales, B308589

In 1998, 16‑year‑old Steven Rudy Gonzales joined a gang fistfight in which a rival was shot and killed; he denied knowledge of any gun and did not intend to kill. He was convicted under a natural‑and‑probable‑consequences theory of first‑degree murder with a §12022.53 firearm enhancement and a §186.22(b) gang finding, and sentenced to 25 years‑to‑life plus 25 years‑to‑life.
After a successful habeas petition under People v. Chiu, his conviction was reduced/resentenced to second‑degree murder; later he pursued relief under SB 1437/§1170.95 to vacate the murder conviction.
The trial court granted the §1170.95 petition and, because the jury had been instructed that the uncharged target offense was simple battery (§242), redesignated the conviction as battery.
The prosecutor sought sentencing under the post‑offense §186.22(d) gang enhancement provision (which elevates certain misdemeanors to felonies with 1–3 years or otherwise imposes a 180‑day minimum). The court applied §186.22(d), imposed the high term of three years (plus parole), and gave credit for time served.
Gonzales appealed, arguing (1) applying §186.22(d) violated the ex post facto and due process clauses because battery was a misdemeanor at the time of the offense, and (2) the court abused its discretion by failing to consider his post‑conviction rehabilitation when selecting a felony high term.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Gonzales)	Held
Application of §186.22(d) at resentencing under §1170.95 — ex post facto/due process	Applying §186.22(d) on resentencing is permissible when resentencing is based on the record and the new sentence does not exceed the original punishment; SB 1437/§1170.95 contemplates resentencing to supported offenses.	Elevating battery to a felony under §186.22(d) increased punishment relative to law at the time of the offense, violating ex post facto and due process (lack of notice/foreseeability).	No violation: ex post facto inquiry asks whether the new penalty is more severe than the punishment assigned to the defendant’s conduct when committed; Gonzales’s conduct was punishable as murder (15‑to‑life), so application of §186.22(d) did not disadvantage him.
Abuse of discretion in imposing felony high term without considering rehabilitation	Court properly exercised discretion based on crime facts and sentencing framework; defense did not present evidence or argue rehabilitation at resentencing.	Court failed to exercise discretion and ignored post‑conviction rehabilitation, so it should have imposed a misdemeanor or lower term.	No abuse: defendant forfeited the issue by not presenting evidence/argument; record shows the court considered the facts and reasonably imposed the three‑year term.

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981) (ex post facto prohibits retrospective laws that disadvantage defendants)
People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (Cal. 2014) (limits on natural‑and‑probable‑consequences murder liability)
People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825 (Cal. 2007) (distinguishing statutory ex post facto review from judicial decisions)
People v. Park, 56 Cal.4th 782 (Cal. 2013) (factors for sentencing a wobbler based on rehabilitation)
People v. Snook, 16 Cal.4th 1210 (Cal. 1997) (California ex post facto clause interpreted like federal counterpart)
People v. Kidane, 60 Cal.App.5th 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (forfeiture where defendant failed to raise sentencing argument below)
People v. Scott, 9 Cal.4th 331 (Cal. 1994) (issues of forfeiture and sentencing argument presentation)