People v. Gonsalves
A159031
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jun 30, 2021Background
- In Nov. 2017 police found Michael Gonsalves with a knife, multiple cell phones, credit cards in others’ names, and a hotel key card containing another person’s credit card data; phones contained others’ personal identifying information. A jury convicted him of misdemeanor grand theft (Pen. Code § 484e(d)) and felony fraudulent possession of personal information (§ 530.5(c)(3)).
- At sentencing the court imposed three years felony probation, citing Gonsalves’s lengthy nonviolent but concerning criminal history and poor prior probation performance.
- As a probation condition the court prohibited Gonsalves from “associat[ing] with[] any person known to [him] to have a criminal record.”
- On appeal Gonsalves challenged that condition as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad (raised as pure legal issues so reviewable for the first time on appeal).
- The Court of Appeal held the term “criminal record” is impermissibly vague (it can reasonably be read to include mere arrests without charges or convictions) and that the blanket prohibition is not carefully tailored to the government’s rehabilitative and public-safety interests.
- The court reversed in part, struck the defective condition, and remanded for resentencing; it also agreed defendant could seek reduction of probation term under Assembly Bill No. 1950.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether condition forbidding association with persons having a “criminal record” is unconstitutionally vague | Term is sufficiently clear when read with knowledge requirement and context | “Criminal record” has no settled meaning and may include mere arrests; knowledge element does not cure vagueness | Condition is unconstitutionally vague because it can encompass arrests without charges or convictions and thus fails fair‑warning and administrability requirements |
| Whether condition is unconstitutionally overbroad | Prohibition reasonably advances rehabilitation and public safety (e.g., barring contact with those who commit crimes) | Blanket ban reaches persons with mere arrest histories and is not narrowly tailored to prevent future criminality | Condition is overbroad: not narrowly tailored to the state’s interests because arrest records are often non‑probative of bad character |
| Whether probation officer may be delegated authority to define whether “criminal record” includes arrests | People contend probation officer can clarify scope in practice | Delegation would improperly let probation department define the nature of the prohibition | Court rejects delegation; determining the nature/scope of the prohibition is for the court, not probation staff |
| Whether defendant is entitled to reduced probation term under AB 1950 | No opposition to retroactive application of AB 1950’s shorter felony probation cap | AB 1950 is ameliorative and should apply retroactively | Court agrees AB 1950 applies retroactively; remand for resentencing to seek reduced probation term |
Key Cases Cited
- Lent v. State, 15 Cal.3d 481 (adopted three‑prong reasonableness test for probation conditions)
- In re Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th 875 (constitutional challenges to probation conditions can be raised on appeal when they present pure legal questions)
- In re Ricardo P., 7 Cal.5th 1113 (proportionality review factors applicable to probation condition analysis)
- People v. Hall, 2 Cal.5th 494 (courts may consider judicial construction and other law when assessing vagueness of probation conditions)
- In re D.H., 4 Cal.App.5th 722 (knowledge requirement does not cure inherent vagueness of an unclear category term)
- People v. Lopez, 66 Cal.App.4th 615 (context can limit an otherwise vague term, e.g., “gang”)
- United States v. Furukawa, 596 F.2d 921 (distinguishes prohibiting association with currently law‑violating persons from prohibiting association based on past record)
- United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041 (temporal tailoring relevant to association prohibitions)
- Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (arrest alone has limited probative value regarding conduct or character)
