People v. Gomez
240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315
| Cal. | 2018Background
- Ruben Perez Gomez was charged with five murders (convicted of four), robberies, and kidnapping arising from a string of crimes in 1997; jury returned death for two murders (Luna, Patel) and LWOP for two others (Acosta, Dunton).
- Prosecution relied on eyewitness/accomplice testimony (notably Witness No. 1 and No. 3), physical evidence (shotgun and .40-caliber shell matches, fingerprints in an Oldsmobile, burned Camry, pawn records), and gang-expert testimony tying killings to Mexican Mafia motives.
- Defendant alternated between pro se and counsel pretrial; the trial court accepted his request to resume counsel and warned the decision would be final.
- During trial Gomez briefly refused to attend court, producing a 38-minute delay; the court admitted testimony about the refusal and instructed the jury they could infer consciousness of guilt from voluntary absence.
- Gomez’s joint-trial and severance motions were denied; the jury was instructed on accomplice corroboration, guilt/degree, and numerous penalty-phase rules; a mistrial occurred on the Escareno counts and those counts were later dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Gomez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemptive denial of right to self-representation | Court reasonably curtailed serial Faretta vacillations and did not foreclose future Faretta requests | Court’s “final change” remark precluded future exercise of Faretta right | No error; warning akin to Lancaster and not an unequivocal preemptive denial |
| Voir dire hypothetical on accomplice leniency | Hypothetical explained questionnaire and was neutral; no timely objection | Hypothetical improperly vouched for prosecutor’s leniency practice | Forfeited (no objection) and on merits not erroneous |
| Severance (joinder of counts and codefendant) | Joinder was proper, evidence cross-admissible and crimes closely tied | Joinder prejudiced Gomez; some counts weaker and inflammatory; antagonistic defenses with Grajeda | No abuse of discretion; no gross unfairness; jury differentiated among charges |
| Sufficiency of evidence (Luna, Patel, Acosta/Dunton) | Evidence (forensics, fingerprints, phone calls, accomplice testimony, motive, gang context) sufficient to support convictions | Evidence was circumstantial/unreliable accomplice testimony; insufficient to prove shooter/premeditation | Substantial evidence supports convictions and premeditation findings |
| Refusal to appear — admission and jury instruction on consciousness of guilt | Testimony about refusal admissible and jury may consider as one circumstance | Evidence irrelevant; permissive inference unsupported; trial judge biased; instruction and admission violated due process | Admission and instruction erroneous and violated due process, but error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Trial court bias (calling witnesses / controlling presentation) | Court acted within trial-control powers; prosecution presented the witness | Court acted vindictively and usurped prosecutor’s role | No reversible bias; judge erred in tone but did not deny fair trial |
| Gang expert testimony (Mexican Mafia) | Testimony was relevant to motive, modus operandi, witness intimidation | Testimony was inflammatory and exceeded probative scope | Some portions (history, jail violence) should have been excluded as tangential; remaining testimony admissible and any error harmless |
| Admission of Acosta note (Confrontation Clause) | Note non-testimonial or, if testimonial, admission harmless | Note was testimonial and Crawford violation | Note was nontestimonial; alternatively any Crawford error harmless beyond reasonable doubt |
| Prosecutor comments re: defendant reading press (Griffin) | Prosecutor commented on state of evidence, not defendant’s silence | Comments coerced defendant to testify (Griffin error) | No Griffin error; prosecutor attacked absence of defense evidence, not defendant’s silence |
| Juror notetaking & readback comments | Court’s warnings were legitimate cautions to avoid dysfunction; no coercion | Comments elevated notes over observation and discouraged readbacks | No error; instructions viewed in context did not impair juror duties |
| Guilt-phase instruction set (CALJIC 8.71, reasonable doubt language) | Instructions read together cured any ambiguity about degree/unanimity | 1996 CALJIC 8.71 biased jurors toward first-degree verdict | No reversible error; instructions considered as whole were adequate |
| Penalty-phase use of Escareno evidence (accomplice corroboration / §1118.1) | Jurors who found Escareno guilty may consider it as aggravation; evidence sufficiently corroborated to survive §1118.1 | Escareno evidence was insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony and should not be considered at penalty | Denial of §1118.1 proper; allowing individual jurors to consider Escareno as aggravation was acceptable and any instructional omission harmless |
| Admission of jail guards’ ethnicities at sentencing | Ancestry evidence used only to show attacks not racially motivated; relevant to future dangerousness | Mentioning ethnicity invited race-based aggravation and violated due process | Admission and related argument was improper but brief and isolated; error harmless |
| Court admonition forbidding "biblical references" in deliberations | Court properly barred extrinsic texts; jurors may still rely on personal conscience | Instruction overbroad and chilled jurors’ religiously-informed moral reasoning | No error; read in context the instruction only barred bringing external religious texts and did not prohibit reliance on personal beliefs |
| Constitutional challenges to death penalty scheme | Statutory scheme and instructions adequate and constitutional | Various Eighth and due process challenges | Rejected; precedent controls; death sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (right to self-representation requires knowing and intelligent waiver)
- People v. Dent, 30 Cal.4th 213 (Cal. 2003) (trial court’s unequivocal foreclosing of Faretta was reversible)
- People v. Lancaster, 41 Cal.4th 50 (Cal. 2007) (court may admonish repeated Faretta vacillation without preemptive denial)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (U.S. 1993) (severance doctrine; relief when joint trial prevents reliable guilt determinations)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial statements and confrontation clause)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard for constitutional error)
- County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (U.S. 1979) (permissive inferences explained)
- People v. Carrasco, 59 Cal.4th 924 (Cal. 2014) (capital-sentencing scheme and weighing instructions affirmed)