People v. Gillon, 2016 IL App (4th) 140801

Background

In Dec. 2013 Johnnie D. Gillon pleaded guilty to felony aggravated assault and was sentenced to 30 months' probation; two other charges were dismissed under the plea deal.
The State later petitioned to revoke probation after alleged February 28, 2014 offenses; counsel filed a motion raising a bona fide doubt as to Gillon’s fitness to stand trial and a psychiatrist (Dr. Lo) was appointed.
Dr. Lo evaluated Gillon, diagnosed a history of paranoid schizophrenia, and found Gillon unable to cooperate with counsel — concluding he was currently unfit to stand trial; the trial court ordered commitment to the Illinois Department of Human Services (Department).
The Department’s preplacement evaluation (conducted by a licensed clinical social worker less than two weeks later) reported Gillon was fit to stand trial; the parties stipulated to that report and the trial court accepted the stipulation and found Gillon restored to fitness.
At the probation-revocation hearing Gillon was found to have violated probation and, after outbursts and disruptive behavior in court and remarks at sentencing alleging poor communication with counsel, the trial court revoked probation and imposed a 5-year prison sentence.
On appeal Gillon argued (1) the court improperly relied on the parties’ stipulation to the Department report rather than making an independent fitness determination, (2) the court should have sua sponte revisited fitness given his later courtroom behavior, and (3) the court failed to conduct a Krankel inquiry into his ineffective-assistance claim (the court found the first two meritorious and made the third moot).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court improperly accepted the parties’ stipulation to the Department report instead of making an independent judicial fitness determination	The State argued the Department report was sufficient and both parties stipulated, so the court could accept restoration	Gillon argued the court passively rubber-stamped the stipulation and failed to independently assess whether fitness was restored, particularly given (a) the short interval after the psychiatric finding of unfitness, (b) the evaluator was a social worker, and (c) later courtroom behavior	Reversed: court erred; stipulation alone was insufficient and the record must show an independent judicial determination of fitness
Whether the court had an obligation to sua sponte reopen fitness given Gillon’s disruptive and agitated behavior in subsequent proceedings	The State did not contend the court had to reopen fitness after it accepted the stipulation and report	Gillon argued his post-restoration courtroom outbursts recreated a bona fide doubt and the court should have revisited fitness on its own	Reversed: the court should have reconsidered fitness in light of Gillon’s courtroom behavior; restoration order set aside
Whether the court’s reliance on a Department evaluation by a licensed clinical social worker (rather than a psychiatrist/psychologist) was problematic	The State treated the Department report as valid under statute even if prepared by a social worker	Gillon argued the social-worker evaluation, coming shortly after a psychiatrist’s finding of unfitness, warranted greater judicial scrutiny before accepting restoration	Court noted heightened scrutiny appropriate here and that the circumstances (who evaluated him and timing) demanded a fuller inquiry; acceptance of the stipulation was error
Whether a Krankel inquiry was required based on defendant’s claim at sentencing that counsel communicated poorly	The State would assert any claim was inadequately presented or untimely	Gillon raised ineffective-assistance concerns during allocution and sentencing	Not addressed on merits — court found first two errors dispositive and deemed the Krankel claim moot, remanding for fitness hearing and further proceedings as appropriate

Key Cases Cited

People v. Lewis, 103 Ill. 2d 111 (1984) (distinguishes proper stipulations to fitness reports from improper acceptance of experts' conclusions without court inquiry)
People v. Bilyew, 73 Ill. 2d 294 (1978) (ultimate fitness determination is for the court, not the experts)
People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555 (1952) (counsel should not stipulate to a defendant's restoration when defendant is insane and cannot authorize the stipulation)
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984) (trial court's duty to inquire into pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel)
People v. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d 63 (2000) (due process prohibits prosecution of unfit defendants)
People v. Greene, 102 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1981) (presumption that unfitness continues until a valid hearing restores fitness)
People v. Contorno, 322 Ill. App. 3d 177 (2001) (trial court’s fitness finding reviewed for abuse of discretion but must show judicial exercise of discretion)