People v. Generally, 2017 IL App (5th) 140489

Garnell Generally was convicted of murder for a 1985 beating; he was 17 at the time and sentenced to natural life without parole.
After exhausting direct appeal and multiple postconviction attempts, Generally sought leave (April 2014) to file a successive postconviction petition, invoking Miller v. Alabama (2012).
The Madison County circuit court denied leave, finding Generally failed to show the required prejudice because his sentence was discretionary and the sentencing judge had considered his youth.
Generally argued on appeal that (1) he demonstrated prejudice entitling him to file a successive petition and (2) his discretionary natural-life sentence was unconstitutional as applied because the sentencing judge misapprehended adolescent development and the psychological report did not show incorrigibility.
The State emphasized the brutality of the crime, Generally’ extensive violence history, the presentence investigation and psychological report, and the sentencing judge’s explicit consideration of youth and rehabilitative prospects.
The appellate court applied Illinois Supreme Court guidance from Holman and Miller, reviewed the cold record of the original 1986 sentencing, and affirmed denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Generally showed the prejudice required to obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging his life-without-parole sentence under Miller/Holman	State: No prejudice; sentence was discretionary and the trial judge considered youth and attendant characteristics	Generally: He showed prejudice because the sentencing judge misstated youth-related reasoning and the record lacked clear evidence of incorrigibility	Held: No prejudice shown; leave denied — sentencing court considered youth and attendant factors as required
Whether a discretionary life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile was unconstitutional as applied to Generally	State: Sentence constitutional because sentencing judge considered Miller factors and found permanent incorrigibility based on record	Generally: Sentence unconstitutional as applied; judge referenced "age of reason" and the psychological report did not establish incorrigibility or foreclose rehabilitation	Held: Sentence constitutional as applied — trial judge expressly considered chronological age, immaturity, family/home environment, role in the homicide, competence, and prospects for rehabilitation; comments at sentencing were not a Miller violation

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment and courts must consider youth and attendant characteristics)
People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Ill. 2017) (discretionary juvenile life-without-parole is constitutional if sentencing court considered youth and attendant characteristics and found irretrievable depravity/incorrigibility)
People v. McDonald, 405 Ill. App. 3d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (standard of review—denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition reviewed de novo)
People v. Bartik, 94 Ill. App. 3d 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (sentencing court must balance seriousness of the offense and rehabilitative potential when imposing sentence)