People v. Garcia
16 Cal. App. 5th 979
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2017Background
- Defendant Danny Michael Garcia was charged with eight offenses arising from domestic-violence incidents involving his girlfriend Amanda; jury convicted on four counts (burglary, corporal injury to a cohabitant after prior conviction, witness dissuasion, and violating a domestic violence restraining order), acquitted on one, and deadlocked on three; sentence nine years four months.
- Prosecution introduced evidence of prior uncharged domestic-violence acts and jail-call recordings; defense objected under Evidence Code §352 and to the related jury instruction.
- Trial court instructed under former CALJIC No. 2.50.02 permitting jurors to consider charged and uncharged domestic-violence offenses to infer disposition if the jury first found such other offenses by a preponderance of the evidence, while separately instructing conviction required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Defense argued (1) inclusion of certain charged offenses (burglary, dissuading a witness) as "domestic violence" was improper; (2) the CALJIC instruction unconstitutionally lowered the prosecution's burden by applying preponderance to charged offenses; (3) admission of prior acts and sexual-content jail calls was an abuse of discretion under §352; and (4) lack of unanimity instruction on witness intimidation was error.
- Court of Appeal upheld admission of charged-offense propensity evidence under Evidence Code §1109, held preponderance is the proper standard for the preliminary factual finding, found the instruction—read as a whole—did not lower the reasonable-doubt standard, and rejected other evidentiary and unanimity claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether charged offenses may be considered as "other domestic violence" under Evidence Code §1109 | Prosecution: Villatoro permits charged offenses to be used as propensity evidence; charged burglary and dissuasion qualified under statutory definitions. | Garcia: Burglary and dissuading a witness are not "domestic violence" for §1109 purposes. | Held: Court affirmed; burglary (entry with intent to commit DV) and dissuading (jail calls destroying emotional calm) qualify as domestic-violence offenses under §1109. |
| Proper burden of proof for using charged offenses as propensity evidence (preponderance v. beyond a reasonable doubt) | Prosecution: Default evidentiary standard (preponderance) governs the preliminary finding that an offense occurred; reasonable doubt applies only to ultimate guilt. | Garcia: CALJIC 2.50.02 (applying preponderance to charged offenses) lowers the prosecution's burden and creates structural error (citing Cruz). | Held: Court held preponderance is the appropriate standard for the preliminary propensity finding; instruction as a whole made clear guilt required proof beyond reasonable doubt; any instructional error would be trial error and was harmless given the strength and mixed jury verdicts. |
| Admissibility of prior domestic-violence acts and sexually explicit portions of jail calls under Evidence Code §352 | Prosecution: Prior acts and jail calls are relevant to context, intent, credibility, and pattern; probative value outweighs prejudice. | Garcia: Prior acts and phone-sex content were unduly prejudicial and should have been excluded or redacted. | Held: No abuse of discretion; prior violence and calls were probative and not substantially outweighed by prejudice; defendant failed to show prejudice from phone-sex material. |
| Unanimity instruction for witness intimidation charge (count 4) | Prosecution: Jury may convict on any act(s) proven; court answered jury question clarifying unanimity. | Garcia: Failure to give CALJIC No. 17.01 initially on count 4 was reversible error. | Held: Forfeited (defense approved the trial-court response); the court's answer cured the omission and required jurors to agree on which act(s) supported the conviction. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Villatoro, 54 Cal.4th 1152 (Cal. 2012) (charged offenses may be used as propensity evidence under Evidence Code §1108/1109 when properly instructed)
- People v. Reliford, 29 Cal.4th 1007 (Cal. 2003) (upholding CALJIC instruction applying preponderance to preliminary finding of uncharged conduct; jury can apply different standards to distinct findings)
- People v. Cruz, 2 Cal.App.5th 1178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (held CALJIC instruction applying preponderance to charged offenses for propensity purposes unconstitutionally lowered burden and constituted structural error)
- People v. Aranda, 55 Cal.4th 342 (Cal. 2012) (instructional errors that effectively lower beyond-reasonable-doubt standard may be structural but many instructional errors are subject to harmless-error review)
- Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1986) (harmless-error analysis applies to certain constitutional instruction errors when guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt)