2021 IL App (4th) 180142
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background:
- Jonathan R. Galley was charged with multiple sexual offenses against an 11‑year‑old; after a bench trial he was convicted on six counts and sentenced to 37 years in DOC plus mandatory supervised release (MSR) of 3 years to life and sex‑offender registration.
- The MSR included the mandatory statutory condition (730 ILCS 5/3‑3‑7(a)(7.12)) forbidding a person convicted of a qualifying sex offense from accessing or using "social networking websites."
- Galley appealed, arguing the MSR social‑media ban is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment; the State conceded the point and relied on People v. Morger.
- The appellate court analyzed the issue under the overbreadth doctrine and intermediate scrutiny, relying heavily on People v. Morger and Packingham v. North Carolina.
- The court held the MSR provision overbroad and not narrowly tailored, vacated the social‑media prohibition from Galley’s MSR, and otherwise affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- A dissent argued the appeal is non‑justiciable because the contested statutory MSR condition is set by the Prisoner Review Board upon release (and Galley is not due for release for decades), so any ruling would be advisory.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statutory MSR ban on accessing/using social‑networking websites is facially overbroad under the First Amendment | State conceded the provision overburdens First Amendment rights and Morger controls | Galley: blanket ban is facially unconstitutional under Morger and Packingham | The court held the provision is overbroad and facially unconstitutional and vacated that MSR condition |
| Whether the content‑neutral restriction survives intermediate scrutiny (is it narrowly tailored to a substantial governmental interest?) | The ban serves a substantial public interest in preventing contact with victims; State nonetheless conceded Morger controls | Galley: the ban is not narrowly tailored; it sweeps in legitimate speech and non‑ Internet offenders; less restrictive monitoring alternatives exist | The court held the provision fails intermediate scrutiny as not narrowly tailored |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Morger, 160 N.E.3d 53 (Ill. 2019) (Illinois Supreme Court held a nearly identical probation social‑media ban overbroad and unconstitutional)
- People v. Minnis, 67 N.E.3d 272 (Ill. 2016) (framework for First Amendment review of Internet restrictions and overbreadth analysis)
- People v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341 (Ill. 2017) (overbreadth principles applied to conditions on convicted offenders)
- People v. Clark, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014) (overbreadth test reference regarding substantial applications to protected speech)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (U.S. 2008) (statement of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine)