People v. Frutoz
8 Cal. App. 5th 171
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant Jesse Frutoz, with two prior serious/violent felony "strikes," was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, felony possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code §29800(a)(1)), and misdemeanor resisting an officer; jury found he was personally armed with a firearm.
- Under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36), a non-violent/non-serious third-strike defendant generally receives a doubled term, but is disqualified from the reduced scheme if, among other things, he was armed with a firearm "during the commission" of the current offense (§1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iii)).
- The prosecution pled and proved the clause (iii) arming allegation as to the felon-in-possession count; the trial court imposed an indeterminate 25-to-life term as a third-strike sentence.
- Frutoz argued clause (iii) is inapplicable to §29800(a)(1) convictions (felon in possession) because possession cannot be both the offense and the arming or because clause (iii) requires a facilitative nexus (arming must facilitate another substantive crime).
- The Court of Appeal rejected those arguments, concluding the statutory phrase "during the commission" requires only a temporal nexus (arming at some point during the offense), not a facilitative nexus, so clause (iii) can apply to felon-in-possession convictions when the firearm was available for offensive or defensive use.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether clause (iii) of §1170.12(c)(2)(C) (armed with a firearm during the commission) can be pled/proved as to a §29800(a)(1) conviction | People: clause (iii) applies; arming finding properly pleaded and proved, disqualifying defendant from Reform Act reduction | Frutoz: clause (iii) inapplicable to felon-in-possession because possession cannot simultaneously be the substantive offense and the arming, and arming requires facilitative nexus | Held: clause (iii) applies; only a temporal nexus is required ("during"), not facilitative nexus; jury could find firearm was available for use, so arming finding valid |
| Whether clause (iii) functions as an enhancement requiring a facilitative nexus like §12022 enhancements | People: clause (iii) is part of the three strikes eligibility scheme (not an enhancement) and disqualifies eligibility when proved | Frutoz: arming should be treated like an enhancement requiring facilitative nexus to the underlying offense | Held: Clause (iii) is not an enhancement imposing added punishment but an eligibility criterion; different standard than §12022; facilitative nexus not required |
| Whether precedent interpreting "in the commission of" (e.g., Bland) bars application of arming to possession offenses | People: Bland distinguishes the facilitative nexus requirement for enhancements from the Reform Act's temporal "during" language | Frutoz: Bland shows that being "armed" must further the offense; thus cannot apply to mere possession | Held: Bland's facilitative-nexus rule applies to enhancements but not to clause (iii)'s temporal disqualification; the court adopts Osuna reasoning |
| Whether rule of lenity requires resolving any statutory ambiguity in defendant's favor | People: statutory language and voter intent support clause (iii) application; no egregious ambiguity | Frutoz: any ambiguity should be resolved for defendant | Held: Rule of lenity does not apply; no egregious ambiguity that would trigger the rule |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Conley, 63 Cal.4th 646 (2016) (describes Prop 36 reforms to Three Strikes and clause (iii) pleading/proof requirements)
- Bland v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.4th 991 (1995) (interprets "armed with a firearm" for enhancement law and articulates facilitative-nexus requirement for enhancements)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase punishment must be pleaded and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- People v. Osuna, 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 (2014) (holds clause (iii) can apply to §29800 convictions because "during" requires temporal nexus, not facilitative nexus)
- People v. Nuckles, 56 Cal.4th 601 (2013) (discusses limits of rule of lenity and statutory interpretation in criminal context)