People v. French
2017 IL App (1st) 141815
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On August 19, 2010 a drive-by shooting on South Kenwood Ave. killed Roger Kizer and wounded Estavion Thompson; defendant Marcellus French was accused as the passenger shooter and codefendant Bodey Cook as the driver.
- Multiple eyewitnesses (Thompson, Andre Stackhouse, Shevely McWoodson, Sherman Johnson) identified French as the shooter and Cook as the driver; some identifications occurred at photo arrays and lineups days to months after the shooting.
- Defense presented an alibi: Romania Booker and family claimed French stayed with her (she was pregnant) from noon Aug. 19 until their child’s birth Aug. 24; counsel declined to call several potential alibi witnesses or introduce phone/GPS evidence.
- At trial the jury convicted French of first degree murder (with a personal-discharge firearm finding) and aggravated battery with a firearm; he received consecutive terms of 55 and 15 years.
- Posttrial French raised pro se ineffective-assistance claims; the trial court conducted a Krankel preliminary inquiry, denied appointment of new counsel and a hearing, and denied relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (French) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Admission of hearsay (victim’s statement that he wanted to stop Cook to talk about family dispute) | Testimony was non-hearsay (explained course of conduct), admissible as state-of-mind/motive | Admission was hearsay and improper; use in closing as substantive evidence was plain error because the case was closely balanced | Court: Thompson’s testimony was hearsay and admission was error, but error was not plain because evidence was not closely balanced; harmless given other corroborating identification evidence |
| 2. Admission of Johnson’s prior written/grand jury statements about a “beef” between Kizer’s family and Cook | Statements were admissible as prior inconsistent statements and/or substantive evidence under statutory exception | Statements lacked foundation and were hearsay | Court: Johnson’s signed statement and grand jury testimony were properly admitted (some parts as substantive under §115‑10.1 and impeachment); no reversible error |
| 3. Prosecutor’s closing argument referencing motive based on those statements | Rebuttal to defense remark on lack of motive; within permissible latitude | Used inadmissible hearsay as substantive evidence in rebuttal | Court: Remarks invited by defense and reasonable inferences from admissible grand jury/prior statements; no error requiring reversal |
| 4. Posttrial Krankel inquiry and denial of new counsel/hearing on ineffective-assistance claims | Trial court properly probed factual basis; counsel’s answers and court’s questioning were permissible | Inquiry became adversarial, violated due process; court should have appointed new counsel and held a hearing | Court: Krankel inquiry was proper, not adversarial; claims involved trial strategy and did not show possible neglect, so appointment/hearing not required |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984) (procedure when defendant raises pro se posttrial ineffective‑assistance claim)
- People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68 (2003) (new counsel is not automatically required after a Krankel claim; court must first inquire)
- People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52 (2001) (discusses hearsay rule and exceptions; trial court evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)