People v. Franks, 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12

Background

In March 2015 Kimberly C. was found dead in her condominium from asphyxia by strangulation and blunt force injuries; defendant Allen Bocteemus Franks’s DNA was under her fingernails and on a curtain, and he was identified by the victim’s mother as the man present shortly before the body was found.
Franks was arrested the next day in the victim’s van, denied giving a blood sample, and during police interview denied killing the victim but admitted prior altercations and that he had been at the condo.
Pretrial, Franks repeatedly complained about counsel, sought new counsel via Marsden hearings, refused to cooperate with or speak much to counsel, and was evaluated and found competent to stand trial.
At trial defense counsel conceded Franks was with the victim when she was injured (implicitly acknowledging he was the man at the scene) but argued the key issue was what occurred inside the home and urged involuntary manslaughter theory; the jury convicted Franks of voluntary manslaughter and found a prior strike true.
Sentencing imposed an aggregate term of 27 years (upper term doubled for strike plus five-year prior serious felony enhancement) and ordered a $400 restitution payment to the California Victim Compensation Board (CVCB) restitution fund; Franks appealed and also sought postjudgment relief challenging the $400 payment.

Issues

Issue	People’s Argument	Franks’s Argument	Held
Whether defense counsel’s implicit concession in closing violated the Sixth Amendment right to maintain innocence under McCoy	Counsel did not concede guilt of charged crime; trial counsel’s strategy was trial management and permissible where defendant was uncommunicative	Counsel conceded defendant killed the victim contrary to defendant’s clear wish to maintain innocence; McCoy error requires reversal	No McCoy violation: defendant never clearly told counsel he insisted on maintaining innocence; record shows defendant refused to communicate with counsel, so Nixon rather than McCoy governs
Whether remand is required under SB 1393 to allow trial court to consider striking the prior serious felony enhancement	SB 1393 applies retroactively but trial court expressly stated it would not have struck the enhancement; remand would be futile	SB 1393 changed sentencing discretion and remand is required so trial court can exercise informed discretion under the new law	No remand: trial court explicitly stated during sentencing it would not exercise discretion to strike the 667(a) prior, so record shows remand would be futile
Whether the $400 payment to the CVCB was properly imposed as victim restitution	The court had authority under section 1202.4 to order restitution to reimburse CVCB for payments to victims	The $400 order was made without adequate documentation and after the court reserved the amount; defendant is entitled to hearing and proof of amounts paid by CVCB	$400 CVCB restitution reversed and case remanded for a new victim restitution hearing (insufficient documentation and defendant’s right to a hearing violated)

Key Cases Cited

McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. (2018) (a defendant’s clearly stated insistence on asserting innocence prohibits counsel from conceding guilt)
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (counsel may concede guilt where defendant is unresponsive and neither objects nor expressly approves strategy)
In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) (statutory amendments reducing punishment apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments absent contrary intent)
People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014) (no remand where record shows trial court would not have stricken enhancement; defendants entitled to sentencing decisions made with informed discretion)
People v. McDaniels, 22 Cal.App.5th 420 (2018) (remand unnecessary where sentencing record clearly indicates court would not have stricken enhancement)