People v. Franklin
2016 IL App (1st) 140049
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Police responded to a motel theft and were told suspect “DB” (known to be armed) was in room 301; officers encountered Marlon Franklin leaving that room and Franklin used his keycard to admit them.
- Inside, officers saw a large man (later ID’d as David Lathan) and a clear bag of suspected cannabis on a nightstand; officers called for a drug dog.
- Lathan became nervous, jumped a bed, ran out the door and fled; officers pursued Lathan, leaving Franklin alone in the room with the door propped open.
- An officer (Vallow) returned minutes later, observed the bathroom ceiling tiles pushed up, handcuffed Franklin, and, after securing Franklin in the squad car, recovered two guns and ammunition from above the bathroom ceiling tiles.
- Franklin was tried, convicted of two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and sentenced to concurrent six-year terms; he appealed, arguing the warrantless reentry/search violated the Fourth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was officer’s reentry into the room consensual or a new, warrantless entry? | Reentry was authorized by the original consent to enter and by the fact the door remained open and defendant did not object. | Reentry after officers left to pursue the fleeing suspect was a separate entry for which no renewed consent was obtained. | Reentry was part of one continuous, consensual search; officer could lawfully return. |
| Was the search above the bathroom ceiling tiles justified as a search incident to arrest? | The arrest for visible narcotics justified reasonable searches connected to officer safety and evidence preservation. | The ceiling space was outside the arrestee’s immediate control and beyond Chimel scope; search incident to arrest did not permit that intrusion. | Search incident to arrest did not justify accessing ceiling area; it was beyond immediate control. |
| Were exigent circumstances present to excuse a warrant before searching the ceiling area? | The recent violent crime, suspect’s flight, and risk that weapons were concealed justified prompt action without a warrant. | By the time of the search Franklin was handcuffed and secured; probable cause alone does not substitute for exigency. | No exigent circumstances justified bypassing a warrant; officers had time to obtain one. |
| Was suppression of the recovered weapons required? | The State argued exceptions justified the seizure and linked the evidence to probable cause/consent. | Evidence was the product of an unconstitutional warrantless search of a concealed area and must be suppressed. | The trial court erred; the ceiling-search evidence should have been suppressed, requiring reversal of convictions. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- People v. Logsdon, 208 Ill. App. 3d 989 (1991) (brief interruption of a consensual search does not create a second nonconsensual entry)
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limits of search incident to arrest: person and area within immediate control)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (probable cause alone does not justify a warrantless home entry/search)
- People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378 (1983) (exigent-circumstances exception requires compelling need for prompt action)
- People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1 (1994) (factors for assessing exigent circumstances)
- People v. Harrell, 226 Ill. App. 3d 866 (1992) (recognized exceptions to warrant requirement in Illinois)