People v. Franklin
63 Cal. 4th 261
| Cal. | 2016Background
- In 2011, Tyris Franklin (age 16) shot and killed another 16‑year‑old; convicted by jury of first‑degree murder and a personal firearm‑discharge enhancement. Trial court imposed mandatory consecutive 25‑to‑life terms (total 50‑to‑life).
- At sentencing the court had no discretion to strike the enhancement; Franklin would first be parole‑eligible after serving both 25‑year minimums (i.e., ~50 years).
- After sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (invalidating mandatory LWOP for juveniles) and California later enacted Senate Bill No. 260 (Pen. Code §§ 3051, 4801) creating youth‑offender parole hearings and instructing the Board to give ‘‘great weight’’ to youth‑related factors.
- Franklin challenged his 50‑to‑life sentence as the functional equivalent of LWOP under Miller/Caballero; the Attorney General argued Penal Code § 3051 mooted the claim by providing parole review during the 25th year.
- The California Supreme Court agreed § 3051 and related statutes cured the Miller claim by making Franklin eligible for a youth‑offender parole hearing and directing youth‑focused consideration, but remanded to determine whether Franklin had an adequate opportunity at sentencing to develop a record of youth‑related mitigation for the future parole hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Franklin) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness: Whether Penal Code § 3051 moots Franklin's Miller claim | §3051 is an inadequate after‑the‑fact fix; trial court should have considered youth ‘‘at the outset’’ (Gutierrez reasoning) | §3051 provides a meaningful parole opportunity by the 25th year and statutory protections; claim is moot | Held: §3051/§4801 moot Franklin’s Eighth Amendment challenge; parole review during 25th year cures the Miller defect |
| Functional‑equivalent analysis: Whether 50‑to‑life is the functional equivalent of LWOP | 50 years until parole eligibility effectively denies a juvenile a realistic life outside prison; functional‑equivalent of LWOP | The statutes change parole operation by law; parole eligibility at year 25 (under §3051) means the original sentence is not functionally LWOP | Held: Under current law (post‑SB 260) Franklin is not serving LWOP or its functional equivalent; no Miller claim remains |
| Procedural record: Whether Franklin had adequate opportunity at sentencing to make youth‑related mitigation part of the record for future parole | Sentencing occurred before Miller and SB 260; record may lack evidence the Board will need (cognitive, family, school, community statements) | No mandatory baseline hearing required; Board may use other sources and post‑conviction procedures | Held: Remand limited to trial court determination whether Franklin had sufficient opportunity to create a record of youth‑related mitigation; if not, court may receive evidence for the record |
| Remedy / Sentencing relief: Whether trial court must strike enhancement or resentence | Strike firearm enhancement or resentence to avoid functional LWOP | Legislature intended §3051 to operate by law; striking enhancement unnecessary because §3051 affords parole review | Held: No rewriting of enhancement statute; original consecutive terms remain but are effectuated by §3051 parole eligibility—no resentencing required |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (juveniles categorically ineligible for death penalty)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juveniles ineligible for LWOP for nonhomicide offenses; ‘‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release’’)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth‑related mitigating factors)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller announced substantive rule; Miller protections apply retroactively)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (California: ‘‘functional equivalent’’ concept for LWOP applied to lengthy de facto life terms)
- People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (availability of post‑sentence recall under §1170(d)(2) does not cure Miller deficiency where LWOP was imposed without youth consideration)