People v. Frahs
9 Cal.5th 618
| Cal. | 2020Background:
- In March 2016 Eric Frahs, who suffers from schizoaffective disorder, threw rocks at cars, assaulted a store owner, and stole two beverages; a jury convicted him of two second-degree robberies and a misdemeanor, and a court found a prior serious-felony allegation true; he was sentenced to nine years.
- While his appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Penal Code §§1001.35–1001.36 (2018), creating a pretrial mental-health diversion program that can lead to dismissal after successful treatment and a maximum two-year diversion period.
- The Court of Appeal held §1001.36 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments, conditionally reversed Frahs’s convictions, and remanded for a diversion eligibility hearing because the record showed he had a qualifying mental disorder.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the statute applies retroactively and whether the Court of Appeal’s conditional reversal and limited remand were correct.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: it held Estrada’s inference of retroactivity applies to §1001.36, found no clear legislative intent to limit application prospectively, and approved a conditional limited remand for an eligibility hearing where the record shows at least a qualifying mental disorder.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Penal Code §1001.36 (mental‑health diversion) applies retroactively to cases not yet final | §1001.36 is pretrial by definition (available until "adjudication") and procedural, so it should apply prospectively only | The statute is ameliorative for a class (mentally disordered defendants) and, under Estrada, presumptively applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments | The Court held §1001.36 is ameliorative and Estrada applies; no clear legislative signal rebuts retroactivity, so it applies to nonfinal cases |
| Whether timing/procedural language ("until adjudication", waiver of speedy trial, "pretrial") rebuts Estrada | Those provisions show the Legislature intended diversion only before adjudication, rebutting retroactivity | Such language describes ordinary operation and does not clearly show an intent to deny retroactivity | The Court rejected this; timing language describes normal procedure and does not "clearly signal" prospective‑only intent |
| Appropriate remedy when case is nonfinal on appeal | Remand is unwarranted unless appellant proves all §1001.36 eligibility criteria on the appellate record | Appellate remand is appropriate when the record affirmatively shows at least a qualifying mental disorder; trial court should decide remaining criteria | The Court approved a conditional limited remand when the record shows at least the first threshold requirement (qualifying disorder); trial court to hold eligibility hearing and may grant diversion if criteria met |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) (ameliorative changes to criminal law are presumptively retroactive to nonfinal judgments)
- People v. Superior Court (Lara), 4 Cal.5th 299 (2018) (applied Estrada to a law that reduced possible punishment for a class — juveniles — and confirmed retroactivity)
- People v. Francis, 71 Cal.2d 66 (1969) (Estrada inference applies to statutes granting courts greater sentencing discretion)
- People v. Nasalga, 12 Cal.4th 784 (1996) (Estrada governs absent an express savings clause or clear contrary legislative intent)
- People v. Conley, 63 Cal.4th 646 (2016) (reinforces that ameliorative statutes are retroactive unless Legislature clearly signals otherwise)
